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ARTICLE
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NATIONS
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The rights of foreign states under the U.S. Constitution are becoming more
important as the actions of foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises
expand in scope and the legislative protections to which they are entitled
contract. Conventional wisdom and lower court cases hold that foreign
states are outside our constitutional order and that they are protected neither
by separation of powers nor by due process. As a matter of policy, however,
it makes little sense to afford litigation-related constitutional protections to
foreign corporations and individuals but to deny categorically such
protections to foreign states.
Careful analysis shows that the conventional wisdom and lower court
cases are wrong for reasons that change our basic understanding of both
Article III and due process. Foreign states are protected by Article III’s
extension of judicial power to foreign-state diversity cases, designed to
protect foreign states from unfair proceedings and to prevent international
conflict. The Article III “judicial power” over “cases” imposes procedural
limitations on federal courts that we today associate with due process. In
particular, Article III presupposes both personal jurisdiction and notice for
all defendants, not just foreign states. Under the Fifth Amendment, foreign
states are “persons” due the same constitutional “process” to which other
defendants are entitled. “Process” only reaches defendants within the
sovereign power, or jurisdiction, of the issuing court, clarifying the obscure
relationship between due process and personal jurisdiction for all
defendants.
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Examining the Constitution from the perspective of foreign states thus
reveals the document in a new light, illuminating its core features in ways
that advance our historical and theoretical understanding of Article III and
due process. The analysis also lays the groundwork for determining whether
foreign states have additional constitutional rights.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the status of foreign nations under the U.S. Constitution? The
question is strangely unresolved. Foreign nations were, to be sure, an
important audience for the Constitution.1 The framers endeavored to
convince foreign states that the United States would make good on its treaty
obligations and would otherwise comply with international law, would have
1. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Being Seen Like a State: How Americans (and Britons) Built
the Constitutional Infrastructure of a Developing Nation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239, 1242
(2018) (“Many Founders conceived of the Federal Constitution in particular as a promise to
foreign nations . . . .”).

2019]

DUE PROCESS AND FOREIGN NATIONS

635

the power to control foreign commerce, and would be strong enough to ward
off potential foreign invasion and other depredations.2 Enhanced credibility
with foreign governments would create the commercial and political
conditions necessary for the United States to grow and prosper.3 The
opinions, interests, and rights of foreign nations were thus an omnipresent
and even menacing backdrop to the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution. Yet concerns about foreign nations were, in the main, satisfied
by centralizing power in the federal government, not by conferring any
constitutional rights or benefits on foreign nations themselves. Indeed,
Britain was the foreign nation whose presence loomed largest, but the
Revolutionary War was fought for the very purpose of political and
constitutional independence from British rule. It might seem unlikely that
the Constitution would protect Britain, or any other foreign nation.
The “foreign State,” the U.S. Supreme Court observed in the early
twentieth century, “lies outside the structure of the Union.”4 Consistent with
that view, modern case law from the lower courts generally excludes foreign
states and some foreign state-owned corporations from constitutional
protections. But current doctrine is haphazard and unclear. The Supreme
Court has suggested,5 and lower courts have held, for example, that foreign
states are not “persons” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.6 The Daimler corporation and the Palestine Liberation
Organization are thus protected by due process, but Germany and Israel are
not.7 All other aliens, after all, have constitutional rights—just not foreign
states.8 The Supreme Court has emphasized in various contexts the need to
avoid judicial decisions that threaten to generate conflict with other

2. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361–69 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); see also THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 15, 22 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 3 (John Jay), NO. 63 (James Madison).
3. JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTILISM AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 117, 128 (1993).
4. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934); see also Frontera
Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009)
(stating that the “foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union”) (quoting Principality
of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d
82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[F]oreign nations . . . are entirely alien to our constitutional
system . . . .”); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483,
522 (1987) (similar).
5. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Frontera, 582 F.3d at 399; see also infra Part I.A.1.
7. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (holding without
analysis that Daimler AG, a German corporation, has Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the
Palestinian Authority has Fifth Amendment due process rights); Waldman v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 344 (2d Cir. 2016) (overturning a $655.5 million judgment
because the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants); Corporacíon
Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción,
832 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that foreign nations have no Fifth Amendment due
process rights).
8. See generally Gerald Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
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countries,9 but modern doctrine involving the constitutional rights of foreign
states has developed in the opposite direction. Affording constitutional
protections to foreign corporations but not to foreign states also requires
courts to distinguish between the two kinds of entities for constitutional
purposes. Courts have struggled with this task in personal jurisdiction cases,
which is unsurprising because the constitutional rationale for the distinction
is unclear.10 Also unresolved is the extent to which foreign states and foreign
state-owned enterprises are protected by the “principle of separation of
powers,”11 which limits the conduct of each branch of government.
As foreign states and foreign state-owned enterprises expand their
commercial activities and engage with the United States in new ways,
especially in the cyber, terrorism, and economic-espionage contexts,
litigation against them is increasing in scope and importance.12 Questions
about their constitutional status, which to date have been litigated mostly in
the context of personal jurisdiction, are likely to assume greater significance
in many additional contexts, including in criminal prosecutions of
corporations owned by foreign states.
Missing is a historical and textual analysis of what the Constitution says
about foreign states and of the goals that animated their inclusion in, or
exclusion from, our constitutional system. In terms of current doctrine, the
constitutional status of foreign states is of most importance for personal
jurisdiction, an area in which originalist sources have often had little
significance. Yet when it comes to the personal jurisdiction protections due
to foreign states, the Supreme Court’s influential dicta is based on
constitutional text: the word “person” in the Fifth Amendment.13 As it turns
out, a textual and historical analysis of the constitutional rights of foreign
states ultimately gives us an important originalist lens for understanding the
Article III and due process–based personal jurisdiction rights of all
defendants. Text and history are also fruitful avenues of inquiry because they

9. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016);
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115
(2013); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005).
10. See, e.g., GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Williams, J., concurring); see also infra Part I.A.2.
11. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (noting that “courts have
consistently regarded . . . the principle of the separation of powers only as protections for
individual persons and private groups”). But cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310,
1329 (2016) (assuming without discussion that an Iranian state-owned enterprise was
protected by separation of powers). This Article occasionally (including in the title) uses the
term “rights” to refer both to the separation of powers limitations on governmental power and
to the direct protections afforded by the Constitution to individuals and other entities. That
usage is consistent with this Article’s claim that there was substantial overlap in the
protections afforded by Article III and those afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
12. See infra notes 29–44 and accompanying text.
13. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). The leading
scholarly treatment of foreign states and the Constitution concludes that text and history have
little to offer and that foreign states lack constitutional rights as against the federal
government. See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 488. This Article disagrees.
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yield straightforward and sensible answers to modern questions about the
constitutional status of foreign states.
The Constitution mentions foreign states in several places: in negative
terms through the prohibition on emoluments and other relationships14 and
also in the positive grants of authority in Articles I and III.15 Of particular
importance to the litigation-related rights of foreign states, Article III extends
federal judicial power to cases involving foreign states, termed here “foreignstate diversity jurisdiction.” Largely uncontroversial, this form of diversity
jurisdiction was intended to provide a fair forum to resolve disputes
involving foreign nations and to avoid conflict between the United States and
foreign powers.16 Article III also assigns cases between foreign states and
U.S. states to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,17 giving foreign
states a right of access to the Supreme Court that does not depend upon
Congress for its execution. That Article III protects foreign states in this way
might not seem so important. But it means that foreign states are not
categorically excluded from separation-of-powers protections, that the
Constitution was intended to benefit foreign states as a way of ensuring peace
and prosperity for the United States, and that foreign states are not entirely
outside the structure of the federal government.
Turning to the Fifth Amendment,18 historical sources show that foreign
states were viewed as “persons” entitled to “process.” Both “process” and
“persons” were terms with straightforward application to states, foreign
states, and the property of both during the country’s founding era.19 Foreign
states, like other litigants, are thus protected by due process. Note, however,
that the content of those due process protections is a distinct issue. With
respect to personal jurisdiction, the best reading may be that Congress
controls the content of personal jurisdiction protections due to all defendants
under the Fifth Amendment.20 That argument is contrary to many lower
court cases holding that the Fifth Amendment (like the Fourteenth
Amendment) requires minimum contacts, but the Supreme Court has not

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust
under them, shall . . . accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title . . . from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.”); id. § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . .
enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power . . . .”).
15. Id. § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations . . . .”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States to cases
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
18. This Article analyzes due process under the Fifth but not the Fourteenth Amendment.
Foreign states are almost always sued in federal court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part III.A; see also Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 420 (2010) (“This positivist interpretation of the Due
Process Clauses reads the due process requirement to mean only whatever ‘process’ is ‘owed
according to positive law.’”).
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resolved the issue.21 In any case, however, foreign states and private foreign
corporations are on equal due process footing, contrary to a long line of lower
court cases drawing a constitutional distinction between them.22
The procedural protections to which foreign states are entitled, including
the requirements of personal jurisdiction, flow not just from the Fifth
Amendment, however. Perhaps not surprisingly, although almost entirely
overlooked,23 Article III also imposes procedural limitations on the federal
courts beyond those that we normally characterize as limitations on subject
matter jurisdiction. Approaching the Constitution from the perspective of the
protections due to foreign states brings the argument into focus. Even if
foreign states are not “persons” entitled to due process—contrary to the
argument advanced in Part II.B of this Article—they are nevertheless
protected by any limitations on judicial power that are baked into Article III.
And limitations there are, including those that arise from Article III’s
language vesting the federal courts with “judicial power” over “cases.”
These terms confer subject matter jurisdiction only if there are “parties to
come into court, who can be reached by its process, and bound by its
power.”24 To have “judicial power” over a “case” requires both personal
jurisdiction and notice, as a matter of separation of powers, not due process.
Analyzing due process and Article III in terms of their significance for
foreign states does not track modern doctrinal categories, and it has a variety
of implications beyond the rights of foreign states themselves. It reveals the
Constitution as pragmatic, outward-facing, and innovative.25 Doctrinally,
the analysis suggests that, contrary to the modern consensus, U.S. states are
“persons” protected by due process. The procedural content of Article III,
and its overlap with Fifth Amendment protections, opens up a new area of
inquiry and also supports the claim that due process limitations on legislative
and executive power are instantiations of separation of powers.26 Due
process as separation of powers, indeed.
The analysis of foreign states also illuminates our understanding of
personal jurisdiction. Modern scholars have generally focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and struggled to understand the
relationship between personal jurisdiction and “due process” as famously
21. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part I.A.2, III.A.
23. But cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1654 (2002) (arguing that without personal jurisdiction there is no “case”
under Article III but focusing only on the implications of this argument for litigation involving
U.S. states).
24. John Marshall, Speech of the Hon. John Marshall Delivered in the House of
Representatives of the United States on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, in 4
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 96 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984).
25. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935–36, 980–1015 (2010) (describing the founders’ objectives, including
their desire to integrate the United States into the community of “civilized” nations).
26. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012).
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articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff.27 The foreign-state perspective shifts focus
to the Fifth Amendment and establishes a robust relationship between its
requirement of due process and personal jurisdiction for all defendants in
federal courts. Process was limited not just by territory but also by the power
or jurisdiction of the sovereign. The latter limitation on process often arose
when sovereigns were sued because they (and their property) could be within
the territory of another state, yet “process” could not reach them because the
court lacked power or jurisdiction over them.28 The language used to
describe whether foreign states and U.S. states could be sued in particular
courts shows that “process” was understood in jurisdictional terms: process
reached only those within the court’s jurisdiction. By requiring due process,
the Fifth Amendment required not just the act of service or notice but also
personal jurisdiction.
An overarching purpose of Article III was to create a forum that brings the
“foreign” into the domestic. Diversity jurisdiction and alienage jurisdiction
perform this function for out-of-state parties and for noncitizens. Article III’s
inclusion of foreign states in this system was no aberration and was not left
to chance. Foreign states are unequivocally drawn into the fabric of the
Union for the very purpose of protecting them and limiting international
conflict. Litigation-related rights, both civil and criminal, should thus
generally apply to foreign states and state-owned enterprises. In terms of
additional constitutional rights, many have limited applicability because
foreign states are not natural persons and because much of their conduct takes
place abroad. But the analysis should be right-by-right, not one that trades
on false conceptions of general constitutional inclusion and exclusion.
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I analyzes recent cases on the due
process and separation of powers rights of foreign states and their stateowned enterprises. Part II argues that Article III extends federal judicial
power to foreign-state diversity cases in order to protect foreign states and to
avoid foreign conflict. Article III itself includes personal jurisdiction and
notice limitations on federal judicial power, and those limitations apply to all
defendants. This Part also explains that Fifth Amendment due process
protects foreign states, which are “persons.” Part III explores the content of
personal jurisdiction protections due to all defendants today, considers other
due process rights to which foreign states are entitled, and lays the
groundwork for analyzing additional constitutional rights to which foreign
states may be entitled.

27. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with
Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1111 (1994) (questioning the relationship between
due process and personal jurisdiction); Robin Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal
Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23, 26 (2019) (noting that personal jurisdiction
“encompasses doctrines and concepts that are not . . . obvious fits with due process”); Stephen
E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (2017) (describing the relationship
between due process and jurisdiction as a “mystery”).
28. See infra Parts II.B.1, III.
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I. CURRENT DOCTRINE AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Consider the following scenarios. A foreign state is designated as a
sponsor of terrorism and is sued by American citizens who claim they were
tortured in the foreign state. The foreign state moves to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The
plaintiffs argue that foreign states are not “persons” protected by due
process.29 Or, a foreign corporation related to a foreign state is sued in
federal court. The corporation moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that the foreign corporation has no due
process rights because the foreign corporation should be treated as the foreign
state itself and foreign states are not entitled to due process protections.30 Or,
a foreign state argues that a statute is unconstitutional because it creates
liability for actions that took place in the past, because it directs the court to
hold for a particular party during ongoing litigation, or because it violates the
nondelegation doctrine.31
Situations like the foregoing are increasingly common, in part because the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197632 (FSIA) has been repeatedly
amended to reduce the immunity to which foreign states are entitled. Those
amendments also reduce the immunity to which certain state-related entities,
such as some state agencies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), are
entitled.33 To the extent that such entities cannot be sued under the FSIA,
personal jurisdiction and other due process issues will not arise. As the
statute is amended to limit immunity, however, these defenses are litigated
29. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); see also Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012)
(asking whether due process limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state);
Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 398–400 (2d
Cir. 2009) (same); Estate of Hirshfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 330 F. Supp. 3d 107, 137
(D.D.C. 2018) (same); Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 697 F. Supp.
2d 46, 56–57 (D.D.C. 2010) (same).
30. See, e.g., Corporacíon Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v.
Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l
Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., concurring); Frontera, 582 F.3d
at 400; TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
31. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (rejecting the
Central Bank of Iran’s argument that the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
violated separation of powers); Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 888–93 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (rejecting Sudan’s contention that terrorism-related provisions of the FSIA violate the
nondelegation doctrine); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 298 F. Supp. 3d 631, 659
n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting Saudi Arabia’s argument that the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act violated due process).
32. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
33. See, e.g., Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat.
852 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.); Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317–
19 (describing congressional limitations on the immunity of foreign states and related entities
for conduct related to terrorism); Comment, Immunity of Foreign Governmental
Instrumentalities, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 176, 178–80 (1957) (distinguishing between agencies,
instrumentalities, and SOEs).
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with greater frequency. The scope of activity by foreign states and stateowned enterprises is also expanding:
terrorism, election-meddling,
cybertorts, investments by sovereign wealth funds, and economic espionage
serve as examples.34 State-owned enterprises are big business and so are
judgments and arbitral awards against them.35
Litigation involving foreign states and SOEs appears to be increasing in
part due to growing scrutiny of their conduct by the U.S. government. For
example, the Department of Justice has indicted several SOEs for economic
espionage.36 Individual actors with varying ties to the governments of China,
Iran, North Korea, and Russia have also been indicted over the past few
years;37 some of those individuals work for private entities with unclear
relationships to the government in question.38 Changes to the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States, an interagency committee that
reviews foreign direct investment in the United States, now require greater
scrutiny of transactions involving foreign states, setting the stage for
constitutional and other challenges to its procedures.39 Two private
companies with apparently significant ties to their governments have recently
challenged various restrictions on their business activities as
unconstitutional. Kaspersky Lab, a Russian company, unsuccessfully argued
that a law prohibiting the federal government from using its products or
34. See, e.g., Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12-CV-508 (RCL), 2017 WL
2399454, at *15 (D.D.C. June 1, 2017); Ingrid Wuerth, The DNC v. Russia: The Question of
Foreign Sovereign Immunity, LAWFARE (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dncv-russia-question-foreign-sovereign-immunity [https://perma.cc/Z2VF-YKNH] (describing a
case brought against Russia for election-related hacking).
35. See, e.g., Pemex-Exploración, 832 F.3d at 99 (analyzing a $300 million arbitral award
against a Mexican state-owned enterprise); Sarah Kramer, Public v. Private: State-Owned
Enterprises as Claimants in ICSID Arbitration, U. PA. J. INT’L L., http://pennjil.com/aboutthe-journal-of-international-law-jil [https://perma.cc/3ZPN-7A9Q] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
(“SOEs are increasingly becoming leaders in international investment . . . .”).
36. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan
Company, and Three Individuals Charged with Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-company-taiwan-company-and-threeindividuals-charged-economic-espionage [https://perma.cc/28LZ-ZMMF]. Both the U.S.
government and U.S. companies have linked many other cyberattacks to foreign governments.
See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 489
(2017).
37. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nine Iranians Charged with Conducting
Massive Cyber Theft Campaign on Behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Mar.
23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-iranians-charged-conducting-massive-cybertheft-campaign-behalf-islamic-revolutionary [https://perma.cc/Z5S6-QB44]. See generally
Chimène Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 207 (2019).
38. See Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Chinese Hacking Indictments and the
Frail “Norm” Against Commercial Espionage, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hacking-indictments-and-frail-norm-against-commercialespionage [https://perma.cc/P98L-RW68].
39. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 reformed the
procedures used by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to increase
scrutiny of foreign states. See Robert D. Williams, CFIUS Reform and U.S. Government
Concerns over Chinese Investment: A Primer, LAWFARE (Nov. 13, 2017), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/cfius-reform-and-us-government-concerns-over-chinese-investmentprimer [https://perma.cc/T534-5MH6].
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services was an unconstitutional bill of attainder,40 and Huawei has alleged
that a similar ban on its products violates its due process and other
constitutional rights.41
A basic issue lies at the heart of cases brought by and against foreign states
and SOEs: the constitutional rights to which such parties are entitled.
Congress has opened the door to more litigation against foreign sovereigns
and SOEs, including some that arguably lack “minimum contacts” with the
United States, and has increased the scrutiny of property interests acquired
by foreign states and SOEs, raising other potential due process issues.42
Furthermore, Congress has designated the property of foreign SOEs for
execution in pending litigation, has delegated broad authority to the President
to designate entities as state sponsors of terrorism, and has limited the ability
of certain foreign corporations to do business in the United States, all of
which arguably violate separation of powers or other constitutional
limitations. The constitutional rights of SOEs may also limit the work of
federal prosecutors in criminal cases alleging economic espionage and theft.
The significance of SOEs to federal law enforcement is highlighted by the
grand jury subpoena directed at an unidentified SOE from an unnamed
country as part of the Mueller investigation.43 Yet it remains unclear whether
foreign states are entitled to any constitutional protections at all. If they are,
the actions of Congress may be constitutionally limited by due process,
separation of powers, the Takings Clauses, and so on. Federal prosecutors
might be limited by various constitutional protections generally available to
corporate defendants in criminal cases, including protections against
excessive fines, double jeopardy, and the constitutional rights to a jury trial
and to the assistance of counsel. If foreign states lie outside the protections
of the Constitution then the constitutional rights of SOEs need clarification:
under what circumstances are they treated as foreign states (without
constitutional rights) as opposed to private corporations (with some
constitutional rights)?44
These questions have, to date, been litigated mostly in terms of personal
jurisdiction. That litigation brings together three distinct and questionable
lines of cases. First, the Supreme Court has held that foreign private
40. Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
41. See Stephanie Zable, Huawei Technologies v. U.S.: Summary and Context, LAWFARE
(Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/huawei-technologies-v-us-summary-andcontext [https://perma.cc/Z7BR-ARBU].
42. For a due process challenge to the work of the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States, see Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the Unites States,
758 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
43. See Amy Howe, Redacted Petition Made Public in Grand Jury Dispute,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/redactedpetition-made-public-in-grand-jury-dispute [https://perma.cc/YGG3-YQM3].
44. In other words, difficult technical and factual questions about attributing the conduct
of nominally private companies to foreign governments and about the ownership and control
of such corporations take on constitutional significance. See generally Christopher Balding &
Donald Clarke, Who Owns Huawei? (Apr. 17, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669
[https://perma.cc/Q3LX-8KJS]
(discussing whether the Chinese government owns or controls Huawei).
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corporations have Fourteenth Amendment due process rights that entitle
them to personal jurisdiction defenses based on minimum contacts and
reasonableness.45 The Court’s analysis in those cases is problematic,46 but
this Article does not address it. Important here is, instead, whether the Fifth
Amendment affords comparable rights to private litigants in federal court, an
issue the Court has not resolved but which lower courts have answered in the
affirmative.47 Second, the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta48 and lower
courts have held49 that foreign states are not “persons” within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. These first two lines of cases
draw a constitutional distinction between foreign states and private foreign
corporations. Foreign private corporations get minimum contacts protections
but foreign states do not.
Third, lower courts have to decide whether SOEs should be treated like
foreign states or like private corporations for constitutional purposes. To do
so, lower courts have applied a federal common law rule (called the Bancec
test), originally developed to determine when foreign states and state-owned
corporations can be held substantively liable for the actions of the other.50
Lower courts have applied the Bancec test to resolve questions about the
constitutional status of SOEs,51 but the fit is not obvious as a doctrinal matter.
As discussed above, the distinction between foreign states without due
process rights and state-related corporate entities with due process rights
hinges—at least following the Court’s reasoning—upon the meaning of the
word “person” in the Constitution. The Bancec test, by contrast, is drawn
45. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see also Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 395 (2016) (describing the importance of personal jurisdiction in
litigation to enforce judgments, including those obtained against foreign sovereigns).
46. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (2006).
47. The Fifth Amendment limitations on personal jurisdiction are infrequently litigated
because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction in federal
courts to the extent that a state court in the forum would have personal jurisdiction. See
generally A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312766 [https://perma.cc/AW7A-CT7X].
Rule (4)(k)(2) does authorize personal jurisdiction in federal question cases based upon
contacts with the United States as a whole but only when there is no state with jurisdiction
over the defendant. When they have reached the issue, lower courts have often assumed or
held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose comparable limitations, except for the
relevant territory. See Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A
Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455,
456 (2004); see also infra note 312.
48. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); see also Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012);
Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir.
2009); Estate of Hirshfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 330 F. Supp. 3d 107, 137 (D.D.C.
2018); Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 697 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56–57
(D.D.C. 2010).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 101–09.
51. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
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from public international law, corporate law, and the FSIA—not the text, nor
history, nor values, nor purposes of the Constitution.52 As a policy matter,
the Bancec test means that SOEs are not treated as the equivalent of foreign
states unless a high “alter ego” standard is met.53 Courts have given no
rationale for this constitutional distinction.
This section explains the haphazard way in which the second and third
lines of cases—those involving personal jurisdiction over foreign states and
SOEs—developed. It also describes the current doctrinal uncertainty around
a closely related issue: whether foreign states are protected by separation of
powers.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The claim that foreign sovereigns and some foreign-state owned
enterprises are not entitled to due process rights is of recent vintage. Before
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,54
courts, litigants, Congress, scholars, and the U.S. government all reasoned or
assumed that the Due Process Clauses (and thus the minimum contacts
analysis) applied to foreign states.55
1. Foreign States
Early cases against foreign states were sometimes brought against the
person of the sovereign, with jurisdiction based on the presence of the
sovereign him- or herself. For example, a mid-nineteenth-century case on
foreign sovereign immunity was brought in British courts against the King
of Hanover, who was temporarily visiting Britain.56 The court had in
personam jurisdiction.57 The king was accorded immunity for sovereign acts
but not for acts he committed as a British subject in Britain.58 The primary
justification for this distinction was that an action based on sovereign acts

52. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams,
J., concurring); see also infra notes 105–10 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir.
2016); DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 71 F. Supp. 3d 201, 216 (D.D.C. 2014). See
generally RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
SELECTED TOPICS IN TREATIES, JURISDICTION, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY § 454 reporters’ note
10 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
54. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
55. See, e.g., William Harvey Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States
Courts, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 482, 486 (1970); Comment, Sovereign Immunity—Waiver
and Execution: Arguments from Continental Jurisprudence, 74 YALE L.J. 887, 887–88
(1965); see also Damrosch, supra note 4, at 493.
56. See Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1844) 40 Eng. Rep. 724, 724–25; 6 Beav.
1, 1–4, aff’d, (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 993.
57. See id. at 731; 6 Beav. at 17.
58. See id. at 744; 6 Beav. at 52–54.
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abroad could not be enforced.59 Other cases against foreign sovereigns were
based on consent to the jurisdiction of the forum state.60
Until well into the twentieth century however, most cases against foreign
sovereigns were brought based upon property of the sovereign located in the
United States—almost always a maritime vessel or its cargo.61 Jurisdiction
was often considered in terms of “process,” just as it had been during the
founding era, as discussed below in Part II.B. In Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship
Pesaro,62 for example, a libel in rem was brought against the steamship
Pesaro: “The usual process issued, on which the vessel was arrested; and
subsequently she was released” because the vessel was “owned and
possessed by [the Italian] government” and was “therefore immune from
process of the courts of the United States.”63 The immunities of state
governments were often interchangeable with the immunities given to
foreign sovereigns.64
For several reasons, the mid-twentieth-century revolution in personal
jurisdiction ushered in by International Shoe Co. v. Washington65 had little
immediate effect on cases against foreign sovereigns. In personam cases
against foreign sovereigns continued to be unusual, in part because there was
no clear mechanism for serving foreign states until the FSIA was enacted in
1976.66 Before those amendments, commencing an action through service
of process upon a foreign sovereign was described as a “‘catch as catch can’
proposition.”67 Moreover, most in personam cases against foreign
sovereigns were based on consent, typically as a result of arbitration
agreements,68 which provided a basis for jurisdiction even absent minimum
contacts. International Shoe also had limited impact on cases involving
foreign sovereigns because those cases were usually brought in rem or quasi
in rem and those bases for jurisdiction were not directly addressed by

59. Id. at 742–43; 6 Beav. at 46–51; see also Laughlin v. La. & New Orleans Ice Co., 35
La. Ann. 1184, 1185 (1883) (“[I]f any judgement based on such substituted service would be
an absolute nullity, incapable of any effect whatever against the person or property of
defendant, it would be mere folly to permit the ear of the Court to be vexed with such useless
and inconsequential proceedings.”).
60. See Duff Dev. Co. v. Gov’t of Kelantan [1924] AC 797 (HL) 801–02 (appeal taken
from Eng.). See generally Sultan of Johore v. Tungku Abubakar [1952] 18 M.L.J. 115 (Sing.).
61. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Chem. Nat. Res. v.
Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1966).
62. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
63. Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 570.
64. See, e.g., Briggs v. Light Boat, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865); see also
THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 38–43 (1970).
65. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
66. See Kevin P. Simmons, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 559–64 (1977).
67. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 921 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Transnational Mar., Inc. v. Republic of Bangladesh, 1975 A.M.C. 1411
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).

646

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

International Shoe and changed only in 1977 when the Court decided Shaffer
v. Heitner.69
When constitutional issues related to personal jurisdiction did arise in
cases against foreign sovereigns, the general assumption was that foreign
sovereigns enjoyed the same constitutional protections as other defendants.
A federal court held in 1975, for example, that it lacked personal jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign that had “minimal contacts with the forum in which
jurisdiction is asserted.”70 Other courts considered whether the notice
afforded to foreign sovereigns not immune from suit comported with due
process.71 During congressional deliberation about the FSIA, executive
branch officials referred to the due process rights of foreign sovereigns. For
example, Attorney General Richard G. Kelindienst and Secretary of State
William P. Rogers wrote that under the FSIA, “a district court can authorize
a special method of service, as long as the method chosen is consonant with
due process.”72 The State Department expressed particular concern with the
attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction over foreign states, a practice
that dates back to the days of the Articles of Confederation.73 The
relationship between attachment of property before the suit and the power to
execute against the property after the suit was also up for debate, linking
jurisdiction and the execution of judgment, just as Sir Edward Coke had
centuries earlier.74
After the enactment of the FSIA, courts continued to reason that due
process and the minimum contacts test protected foreign states and state
agencies.75 The Second Circuit held in 1981, for example, that the Central
Bank of Nigeria was entitled to due process protections because foreign states
are persons under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, citing multiple
earlier cases so holding.76 All of this changed after the Supreme Court wrote
69. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Karen Nelson Moore, Procedural Due
Process in Quasi In Rem Actions After Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 173
(1978).
70. Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Ill.
1975). See generally Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1966); Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat’l Corp., 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1961).
71. See, e.g., Premier S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Alg., 336 F. Supp. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(holding that registered mail service upon the agency of a foreign sovereign which had signed
an arbitration agreement satisfied due process).
72. 119 CONG. REC. 3437 (1973); see also Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R.
3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 41 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (“[T]he jurisdictional standard is the
same for the activities of a foreign state as for the activities of a foreign private enterprise.”).
73. See infra Part II.A.4.
74. Hearings, supra note 72, at 22–24 (statement of Charles N. Brower, Legal Adviser,
Department of State); see infra note 203 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir.
1982). See generally Melanie Howell, Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act—Immunity Exception Provisions of § 1330(a)—Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio &
Television, 14 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 397 (1984).
76. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d
Cir. 1981), overruled by Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582
F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009).
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in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. that: “[a]ssuming, without
deciding, that a foreign state is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process
Clause, we find that Argentina possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would
satisfy the constitutional test.”77
Based on this dicta from Weltover, lower courts have since uniformly held
that foreign states are not “persons” protected by the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.78 As a policy matter, these decisions run counter to the
Court’s efforts to avoid international discord and potential friction with
foreign sovereigns in other personal jurisdiction cases and in other doctrinal
areas including the presumption against extraterritoriality, forum non
conveniens, and international comity.79 They also require courts to draw a
constitutional distinction between foreign corporations and foreign states—a
difficult task that adds complexity and uncertainty.
Lower courts have relied on three arguments to reject personal jurisdiction
protections for foreign states: foreign states are foreign or alien;80 foreign
states are governments, not people or persons;81 and foreign states are sui
generis entities whose relationships with the United States are governed by
international, not constitutional, law.82 The first argument fails quickly.
Aliens, after all, have many constitutional rights.83
The third argument, also advanced by some commentators,84 fails to
acknowledge that the relationship between foreign states and the U.S.
government might be regulated by both the U.S. Constitution and by
international law and that both can govern in the same case.85 The
77. Id. at 619 (citation omitted). The Court had previously held that foreign nations are
persons entitled to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Sherman Act. Pfizer Inc. v.
Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 311, 320 (1978).
78. See, e.g., Corporacíon Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v.
Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l
Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., concurring); Frontera, 582 F.3d
at 400; TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
79. See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1103
(2015); Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave
New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1042–43 (2015); cf. Austen L.
Parrish, Fading Extraterritoriality and Isolationism?: Developments in the United States, 24
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 216–17 (2017) (describing U.S. cases that respect the
“territorial integrity, sovereign equality, nonintervention, and self-determination” of other
nations).
80. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
81. See, e.g., Pemex-Exploración, 832 F.3d at 103; Price, 294 F.3d at 96–97; see also
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
82. Price, 294 F.3d at 97; Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d
192, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
83. See generally Neuman, supra note 8.
84. See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The
1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L.
369, 373–74 (2001); Damrosch, supra note 4, at 519–26, 557–58.
85. International law governs the relationship between the United States and foreign
states. It has also governed some aspects of the relationship among U.S. states and between
the U.S. government and foreign individuals. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730–
31 (1878) (applying international law principles regarding personal jurisdiction to resolve
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Constitution might require personal jurisdiction, for example, but
international or general law might set out the actual rules of personal
jurisdiction.86 And, of course, prize courts in admiralty applied international
law to determine the property interests of foreign sovereigns, although
Article III conferred subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal courts. A
relationship governed by both constitutional law and international law is
analogous to cases in which procedure is governed by one source of law and
substance by another.87 Note, too, that the relationship among states of the
Union was governed by international law before the Constitution was
enacted, and some of those international law protections were preserved and
entrenched by the Constitution itself.88 Finally, affording constitutional
protections to foreign states, including access to the federal courts and related
procedural protections, may help prevent violations of international law,
which were widely associated with the state courts under the Articles of
Confederation and which were a key impetus for the drafting of the
Constitution.89
The remaining argument, one that courts have adopted with almost no
analysis of text or history, is that foreign states are not “persons” under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In part, the argument is based
on the intuition that foreign states should not have constitutional rights that
domestic states lack.90 As the Court noted in Weltover, U.S. states lack due
process protections because the Supreme Court so held in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,91 a decision rejecting South Carolina’s constitutional challenge
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.92 The Court reasoned that “[t]he word
‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass
the States of the Union” and that “the principle of the separation of powers
[served] only as protections for individual persons and private groups, those
who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt.”93

jurisdictional issues amongst U.S. states); Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IV, Sept. 3,
1783, 8 Stat. 80 (Treaty of Paris) (setting forth the terms for British and American creditors
following the Revolutionary War); Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 1309–12 (describing the
views of the British government as to how British creditors were protected by the U.S.
Constitution).
86. See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
87. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
88. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1496–97 (2019).
89. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 25, at 948.
90. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393,
399 (2d Cir. 2009); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
91. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id. at 323–24. The Court’s statement may be incorrect with respect to states, and it
has led courts to the erroneous conclusion that foreign states lack Fifth Amendment rights. It
is also in tension with the more recent trend of allowing government institutions to assert
structural constitutional claims. Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of
Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 616–22, 634–39, 665–67 (2019).
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Even assuming that Katzenbach is correct or at least well settled under
stare decisis, the decision was not about personal jurisdiction. It also does
not mandate the equal treatment of states and foreign states. Katzenbach
rests on the specific relationship between domestic states and the United
States and is explicitly limited to “States of the Union.” The Court’s
reasoning that Article I’s separation of powers should protect those persons
and groups “who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of
guilt” also puts U.S. states and foreign states on different footing.94 Foreign
states do not enjoy many of the institutional protections that U.S. states are
entitled to—foreign states are, in this sense, vulnerable to political action by
the majority in ways that domestic states are not.
In any event, Part II.B shows that the term “person” is best understood to
apply to foreign states. That analysis suggests that the Court’s reasoning in
Katzenbach about domestic states was incorrect—at least to the extent that it
relies upon the meaning of the word “person.”95
2. Foreign State-Owned Enterprises
Cases against agencies and instrumentalities initially followed much the
same pattern as cases against states themselves. Most involved foreign ships
owned by “state trading agencies” and a few were quasi in rem personal
injury cases.96 Instrumentalities raised some distinctive immunity issues,
however. Beginning in 1952, the U.S. government took the position that
immunity for government instrumentalities should depend upon whether the
instrumentality was “governmental” or “proprietary.”97 A propriety
instrumentality was not entitled to immunity and neither were separately
incorporated entities.98 Courts and commentators both in the United States
and abroad struggled to draw the distinction between “governmental” and
“proprietary” based on the purposes of immunity, on the economic system of
the government in question, or on the needs of the instrumentality in terms
of administering government policy.99 Eventually, the FSIA provided
immunity for separately incorporated agencies and instrumentalities of
foreign states if a majority of their shares are owned by a foreign sovereign
or if they are an “organ” of a foreign state.100
94. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
95. Note that the Continental Congress criticized British acts of Parliament in terms that
could suggest that Massachusetts and Boston should themselves have legal protections against
judicial acts of the legislature. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 26, at 1700, 1702–03
(quoting from sources that refer to efforts to “punish Boston” and to actions that “condemn a
whole province without a hearing” and that take away rights “from a great body corporate”).
96. See Comment, supra note 33, at 178 n.6 (collecting cases).
97. Id. at 177 n.3 (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State
to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. ST. BULL. 984
(1952)).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (citing many domestic cases).
99. See Comment, supra note 33, at 178–80.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012) (defining “agency or instrumentality” for the purposes of
the FSIA). The term SOE is generally broader and may include corporate entities that do not
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The FSIA resolved the issue of immunity for SOEs. It did not address
questions of substantive liability involving states and their instrumentalities,
including the circumstances under which a state could be held liable for the
actions of its instrumentalities or vice versa. Shortly after the FSIA was
enacted, the Supreme Court held in First National City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba101 (Bancec) that “government
instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent
from their sovereign should normally be treated as such.”102 Litigants may
overcome the presumption of separateness for the purposes of substantive
liability only by showing that a foreign “corporate entity is so extensively
controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created”
or that separate treatment of the entities “would work fraud or injustice.”103
Turning to the constitutional status of SOEs, questions about their due
process rights arose infrequently. As long as foreign states presumptively
enjoyed the same constitutionally based personal jurisdiction protections as
foreign private corporations, there was no need to distinguish between
foreign private corporations and foreign corporations controlled by foreign
states. After Weltover, however, the distinction became very important.
Lower courts held that foreign states lacked the due process protections to
which foreign corporations are entitled. But how to distinguish the two for
constitutional purposes? Although the rule announced in Bancec is a federal
common law rule based upon public international law, comity, and domestic
corporate law,104 courts of appeals have used the Bancec analysis to
determine whether a state agency is a “person” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.105
The Bancec test has been constitutionalized by the lower courts with no
analysis of why common law regarding corporate and public international
law principles should govern the due process issue. The Second Circuit has
said that the constitutional distinction between foreign states and
corporations “rests on the principle that due process rights can only be
exercised by persons, including corporations, which are persons at law.”106
Straightforward application of this reasoning would apply due process
protections to any entity with corporate form. And if some corporations
should be denied constitutional protections because they are too closely
related to the foreign state itself, why not apply the factors used in other areas
qualify as agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA. The FSIA does not use the term SOE.
International law and practice generally confer immunity on SOEs to the extent that they are
exercising sovereign authority. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED TOPICS IN TREATIES, JURISDICTION, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
§ 454 reporters’ note 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
101. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
102. Id. at 626–27.
103. Id. at 629 (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)).
104. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106
GEO. L.J. 1825, 1835 (2018).
105. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
106. Corporacíon Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. PemexExploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
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of constitutional law that distinguish between governmental and private
conduct, such as the state action doctrine? We might, for example, ask
whether the corporation is performing a government function or whether the
government jointly participated in the conduct.107 As well, a key reason for
applying Bancec to substantive liability issues does not apply to the
constitutional inquiry. The Bancec test was adopted in part based on the
FSIA’s legislative history.108 But using Bancec’s strong presumption of
juridical separation to protect foreign state-owned corporations may thwart
efforts by Congress to regulate their conduct by providing them with
constitutional protections that are unavailable to states themselves.109
Part II of this Article argues that Bancec should not be applied to the issue
of constitutional due process because foreign states and foreign corporations
are both entitled to due process protections. Under current case law from the
courts of appeals, that would mean that both types of entities are entitled to
“minimum contacts” protections. Arguably, however, “minimum contacts”
is the wrong test for both kinds of defendants; perhaps they are entitled only
to what Congress or the “general law” provides, as discussed in Part III. In
either case, applying Bancec to questions of constitutional law lacks any
constitutional basis and is at odds with the purposes of the Bancec test itself.
B. Separation of Powers and Foreign States
Do separation of powers principles protect foreign states? The arguments
canvassed above, that foreign states stand outside the constitutional order and
that relationships with foreign states are regulated only by international law
and comity, both suggest that separation of powers principles do not protect
foreign states.110 Separation of powers principles include the nondelegation
doctrine and other constitutional limitations on the powers of each branch of
government.111 The Supreme Court has reasoned that “the principle of the
separation of powers” only protects “individual persons and private groups,
those who are peculiarly vulnerable to non-judicial determinations of
guilt,”112 further suggesting that foreign states are excluded. Yet in Bank

107. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1412
(2003).
108. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 630.
109. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams,
J., concurring).
110. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2000); see also
Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 289–90 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 864 F.3d 751
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“On the one hand, the D.C. Circuit has held that a foreign sovereign is not a
‘person’ protected by the Fifth Amendment, observing along the way that ‘legal disputes
between the United States and foreign governments are not mediated through the Constitution.
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit has at least once—in this litigation, no less—addressed on
the merits an Article I argument by a foreign sovereign, never suggesting the sovereign had
no right to make it.” (citations omitted)).
111. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087–94 (2015);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–58 (1983); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 584–89 (1952).
112. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
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Markazi v. Peterson,113 the entire Supreme Court assumed without
discussion that the Central Bank of Iran was protected by separation of
powers principles limiting congressional power, and Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Sotomayor would have held in favor of Bank Markazi.114
Perhaps the Court viewed Bank Markazi as a “private group” rather than a
foreign state and therefore entitled to constitutional protections. However,
the facts point the other way: the U.S. government concluded that the Bank
Markazi is owned and controlled by Iran.115
The Bank Markazi case also illustrates the overlap between separation of
powers and due process protections.116 Consider Bank Markazi’s core
argument: that Congress directed the outcome of litigation in a pending
case.117 The parties, as well as the entire Court, agreed that a statute
“directing that in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins’” would be
unconstitutional.118 Although Bank Markazi styled the argument in
separation of powers terms, which is how the Court evaluated it, the
argument could also have sounded in due process. As Nathan Chapman and
Michael McConnell have shown, by the time the Fifth Amendment was
adopted, legislative acts violated due process if they exercised “judicial
power” by depriving “specific individuals of rights or property.”119 In other
words, a law directing that “Smith” wins would violate both due process and
the vesting of the judicial power in the federal courts.
Current lower-court doctrine holds that if the target were Spain instead of
“Smith,” then due process protections would not apply because Spain is not
a “person.” Even a cursory glance at Article III suggests that the vesting of
the judicial power in federal courts does protect foreign states, as the judicial
power explicitly extends to cases involving foreign states. Styled as a due
113. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
114. Id. at 1329–38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
115. See Central Bank of Iran, 31 C.F.R. § 535.433 (2019) (“The Central Bank of Iran
(Bank Markazi Iran) is an agency, instrumentality and controlled entity of the Government of
Iran for all purposes under this part.”). But cf. Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.),
Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 6 (June 14, 2016), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/164/164-20160614-APP-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VN5-UWF6] (arguing that
the United States violated the 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran by disregarding the separate
juridical status of Bank Markazi by attaching assets to satisfy a judgment against Iran).
116. In other areas, too, the relationship between separation of powers and due process
protections is not clear. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018); Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
117. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (“The question we confront today is whether § 8772
violates Article III by invading the judicial power.”).
118. Id. at 1323 n.17.
119. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 26, at 1677, 1679, 1694. Ryan Williams argues
that during the nineteenth century, due process was understood to prohibit the legislature from
“transferring person A’s property to person B” and thus acting “as if it were a court
adjudicating a dispute between private parties.” Williams, supra note 20, at 423–24. As he
notes, this understanding of due process “is closely related to structural principles regarding
the separation of legislative and judicial powers.” Id. at 424; see also JOHN V. ORTH, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 48–49 (2003) (noting that an exercise of judicial power
“by another branch of government could be described as a procedural violation” and that “one
who was not a judge could not make judicial rulings”).
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process violation, therefore, foreign states are not protected under current
doctrine. Styled as a separation of powers violation, however, foreign states
may be protected—or at least the Court assumed as much in Bank Markazi
and the text of Article III suggests as much. Yet it is not clear that the
constitutionality of government actions should hinge on whether the
challenge is framed in separation of powers rather than due process terms.
As Chapman and McConnell argue, in other contexts, due process and
separation of powers have significant overlap. More broadly, it is not clear
if and why Bank Markazi (and Iran) should be protected against the
legislative exercise of judicial power but not against other separation of
powers violations such as the nondelegation doctrine or the limits on
executive power.
II. THE CONSTITUTION FROM A DIFFERENT VANTAGE POINT
The Constitution protects foreign states through both Article III and the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, providing a straightforward
resolution for most issues identified in Part I. Some of the protections to
which foreign states are entitled also apply to other litigants in ways that
modern doctrine does not recognize. These observations change our basic
understanding of Article III—it not only confers subject matter jurisdiction,
it also provides procedural protections that we today associate only with “due
process.”
A. Foreign States
Article III extends the federal judicial power to cases involving “foreign
states.” The history of foreign-state diversity jurisdiction shows that foreign
states have a right to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certain
cases. That right does not depend upon the actions of Congress,
demonstrating that foreign states are not categorically excluded from the
constitutional order and that they are protected by separation of powers.
Article III also provides procedural protections to all litigants in federal court,
including foreign states. The terms “judicial power” and “case” conferred
only limited power on federal courts; those limitations included requirements
of personal jurisdiction and notice. Early litigation against foreign
sovereigns underscores these points and also shows that “process” was
limited both by geography and by the power of the sovereign.
1. Foreign-State Diversity Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States to controversies “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.”120 In so doing, it confers a benefit or a right
120. “Cases” refer to civil or criminal actions, while “controversies” are civil cases. See
William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of
Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265–67 (1990). But cf. James E. Pfander & Daniel
D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious
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upon foreign states. That right is not self-executing, at least not with respect
to the lower federal courts. Instead, lower federal courts only have the
subject matter jurisdiction that Congress chooses to confer upon them, within
the outer limits set by Article III.121 If—and to the extent that—Congress
chooses to confer such jurisdiction on the federal courts, foreign states have
a constitutionally based statutory entitlement to that jurisdiction.122 Placing
foreign states in Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction did signal a
particular focus upon the relationship between courts and foreign sovereigns.
Federal courts would, the framers hoped, minimize conflict that might arise
in cases involving foreign states.
The specifics of federal court jurisdiction were worked out in the
Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The WilsonRutledge draft from the Committee of Detail contains the first recorded
mention of jurisdiction over “foreign states.”123 The earlier plans instead
included language about cases that might generate conflict with foreign
countries. The Virginia Plan, for example, extended jurisdiction of the
“supreme tribunal” to piracy; capture of enemy; “cases in which foreigners,
or citizens of other States, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested”;
and “questions which involve the national peace or harmony.”124 William
Paterson’s New Jersey Plan would have conferred federal court jurisdiction
over cases of capture, piracy, felonies on the high seas, the construction of
treaties, and all cases in which foreigners might be interested.125 After only
minor debate, the Convention adopted a resolution similar to the Virginia
Plan’s language that extended jurisdiction “to all cases arising under the Natl.
laws: And to such other questions as may involve the Natl. peace &
harmony.”126 This language was then sent to the Committee of Detail.127 It
provided the basis for foreign-state diversity jurisdiction, underscoring the
connection between “Natl. peace & harmony” and this form of subject matter
jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1424 (2015) (arguing that controversies, but not cases,
required a “dispute between designated opponents and exclude original petitions for the
performance of the administrative functions associated with non-contentious jurisdiction”).
121. See Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491, 497 (1982).
122. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts in
civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between “a foreign
state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States”). Note that federal district
courts have jurisdiction over cases in which the foreign state is a defendant under the FSIA,
so long as a statutory exception applies.
123. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172–73 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
124. 1 id. at 21–22 (Madison’s notes). Charles Pinckney of South Carolina presented a
plan that called for the creation of federal courts without describing their jurisdiction. 3 id. at
600.
125. 1 id. at 244 (Madison’s notes); see also 3 id. at 626 (Alexander Hamilton’s plan).
126. 2 id. at 46 (Madison’s notes).
127. Id. at 128.
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Though records from the Committee of Detail are limited, the first
reference to “foreign states” appears in the Wilson-Rutledge draft128 and then
in the committee’s final report.129 The Committee of Style’s report was
similar to the version presented by the Committee of Detail and to the final
language of Article III. Subject matter jurisdiction extended to controversies
between “a State or the Citizens thereof” and “foreign states, Citizens or
Subjects.”130
The various kinds of diversity jurisdiction generated little controversy as
the Constitution was drafted.131 As the Constitution was debated at the state
ratifying conventions, diversity jurisdiction for citizens of different states and
alienage jurisdiction (the extension of diversity jurisdiction to cases
involving citizens of foreign states) both came under fire, although alienage
jurisdiction was less controversial.132 The relative (but not total) agreement
on alienage jurisdiction was based upon the widely acknowledged problems
that the British creditors experienced in recovering from U.S. debtors in state
courts.133 Those problems generated by state courts put the United States as
a whole in violation of its treaty obligation and gave rise not only to alienage
jurisdiction in Article III but also to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.134 The goals were to give the United States more negotiating
power on the world stage, to insure the availability of credit to U.S.
borrowers, and to reduce conflict with foreign nations.135
Diversity jurisdiction involving foreign states generated little specific
discussion. Even anti-federalists who proposed language narrowing the
jurisdiction of the federal courts generally agreed that jurisdiction over cases
involving foreign states was appropriate.136 Three fleeting criticisms were
128. Id. at 173 (“[T]o Controversies between (States,—except those wh. regard Jurisdn or
Territory, —betwn) a State and a Citizen or Citizens of another State, between Citizens of
different States and between (a State or the) Citizens (of any of the States) (thereof) and foreign
States . . . .”).
129. Id. at 186–87.
130. See id. at 576, 580 (Committee of Style).
131. Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1466.
132. See, e.g., The Virginia Convention Friday 20 June 1788, in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 1412, 1422 (John P. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1993); cf. Holt, supra note 131, at 1466 n.170 (“From the history I have recited it
must be clear, although perhaps startling, that alienage jurisdiction was the most important
head of jurisdiction in [A]rticle III.”).
133. Holt, supra note 131, at 1473.
134. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 158–59 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1941) (1836)
(William Davie of North Carolina); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
135. The Virginia Convention Friday 20 June 1788, supra note 132, at 1413–14 (James
Madison). Madison gave similar reasons to extend federal judicial power over other foreign
relations issues. Id.
136. See, e.g., Agrippa X, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MASSACHUSETTS 576, 578 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 1998); see also Agrippa XII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted in
id. at 720, 725; Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), in 14
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION 193, 204 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983); The Political Club of
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leveled at foreign-state diversity jurisdiction, all focusing on cases between
U.S. states and foreign states: such jurisdiction was novel,137 states might be
sued by foreign states without their consent, and any judgment against a
foreign state could not be enforced.138 Both James Madison and John
Marshall stated that the consent of the foreign state and of the “American
state” would be necessary and both emphasized the need to avoid
controversies with foreign nations that could arise from state court decisionmaking.139 Marshall also countered the argument that such jurisdiction was
useless because there would be no way to enforce a judgment between a state
and a foreign state. He suggested in response that the parties to such a suit
would acquiesce in its enforcement—following perhaps from the premise
that foreign states would only be subject to suit if they consented to it.140
Danville, Kentucky Debates over the Constitution, 23 February–17 May, in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 408, 412
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988).
137. The Virginia Convention Friday 20 June 1788, supra note 132, at 1423 (statement of
Patrick Henry) (“Is it not the first time, among civilized mankind, that there was a tribunal to
try disputes between the aggregate society, and foreign nations?—Is there any precedent for a
tribunal to try disputes between foreign nations, and the States of America? The Honorable
Gentleman said, that the consent of the parties was necessary: I say, that a previous consent
might leave it to arbitration.—It is but a kind of arbitration at best.”); The Virginia Convention
Saturday 21 June 1788, in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA, supra note 132, at 1440, 1447–48 (statement of William Grayson)
(“A State may sue a foreign State, or a foreign State may sue one of our States. This may
form a new American law of nations. Whence the idea could have originated, I cannot
determine, unless from the idea that predominated in the time of Henry the IVth, and Queen
Elizabeth. They took it into their heads to consolidate all the States in the world into one great
political body. Many ridiculous projects were imagined to reduce that absurd idea into
practice. But they were all given up at last.”).
138. The Virginia Convention Saturday 21 June 1788, supra note 137, at 1448 (statement
of William Grayson) (“My honorable friend [James Madison], whom I much respect, said that
the consent of the parties must be previously obtained. I agree that the consent of foreign
States must be had before they become parties: But it is not so with our States. It is fixed in
the Constitution that they shall become parties. This is not reciprocal. If the Congress cannot
make a law against the Constitution, I apprehend they cannot make a law to abridge it. The
Judges are to defend it. They can neither abridge nor extend it. There is no reciprocity in this,
that a foreign State should have a right to sue one of our States, whereas a foreign State cannot
be sued without its own consent. The idea to me is monstrous and extravagant. It cannot be
reduced to practice. Suppose one of our States objects to the decision, arms must be recurred
to. How can a foreign State be compelled to submit to a decision?”).
139. The Virginia Convention Friday 20 June 1788, supra note 132, at 1414–15 (statement
of James Madison) (“I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided in these
Courts, between an American State and a foreign State, without the consent of the parties. If
they consent, provision is here made. The disputes ought to be tried by the national tribunal.
This is consonant to the law of nations. Could there be a more favourable or eligible provision
to avoid controversies with foreign powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of
the Union to drag the whole community into war? As the national tribunal is to decide, justice
will be done.”).
140. Id. at 1435 (statement of John Marshall) (“Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign
State is cast, will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign State brought a suit against the
Commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the Federal Judiciary
thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary. And, as the Federal
Judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce. It will be the means of preventing disputes
with foreign nations.”).
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2. The Supreme Court’s Appellate and Original Jurisdiction
Moving beyond the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction over “all other Cases before mentioned,” which include cases
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States.”141 To the
extent that cases involving foreign states come within the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, recourse to the Supreme Court may be limited by such
“Regulations as the Congress shall make.”142 Congress’ power to limit or
abolish the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been subject to
much debate,143 but I will assume that Congress may do both.144 Therefore,
with respect to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, although some cases
involving foreign states are included within it, the exercise of a “right” to
such jurisdiction is dependent upon Congress.
Turning to the Court’s original jurisdiction, Article III provides that “[i]n
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction.”145 The phrase “those in which a State shall be Party” refers
back to Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which extends the
judicial power of the United States to, among others, controversies “between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”146
Thus cases between states and foreign states come within the Court’s original
jurisdiction because they are cases “in which a State shall be a party.” The
argument is not that the word “state” refers to foreign states but instead that
“cases in which a State shall be a party” includes cases between a domestic
and a foreign state.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789147 even included cases between a
state and a foreign state in the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction by
providing that
the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its
citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or
aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.148
141. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
142. Id. § 3.
143. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 314–22 (7th ed. 2015).
144. Congress may also give lower federal courts (and even state courts) concurrent
jurisdiction over cases within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Ames v. Kansas
ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 465–66 (1884). I assume that concurrent jurisdiction without
the possibility of review by the Supreme Court is constitutional. FALLON ET AL., supra note
143, at 271. If it is not, then foreign states also have a constitutionally conferred benefit of
access to the Supreme Court in cases between states and foreign states (which fall within the
Court’s original jurisdiction) when such cases are heard originally by state or lower federal
courts.
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
146. California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257 (1895).
147. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
148. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
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Although this language does not explicitly mention foreign states, the phrase
“where a state is a party” includes cases between foreign states and domestic
states because Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 explicitly includes
controversies between states and foreign states.149 Because the text does not
explicitly reference foreign states, one might argue that section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789—and perhaps the Constitution itself in Article III,
Section 2, Clause 2—did not contemplate suits between states and foreign
states within the Court’s original jurisdiction. Perhaps lending support to this
view, the Judiciary Act of 1789 nowhere mentions foreign states
explicitly.150
Not only is that argument belied by the text of Article III itself, which
refers—in Section 2, Clause 1—to cases between states and foreign states, it
is also undercut by the original Senate version of the Judiciary Act of 1789
drafted by Oliver Ellsworth.151 The Senate version provided that “the
supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil
nature, where any of the United States or a foreign state is a party.”152 Thus,
the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were well aware of cases involving
foreign states when they drafted section 13. The revised version puts only
cases between foreign states and domestic states within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court but not cases between the citizens of a state and a
foreign state. The broad language of the Senate draft is intriguing as it
appears to confer jurisdiction beyond what Article III permits. Article III
puts cases “in which a State shall be a party” within the original jurisdiction
of the Court but does not include cases between a citizen of a state and a
foreign state. This Article III problem likely explains why the final version
was narrower in scope. In any event, the phrase “[cases] in which a State
shall be a party” includes, as a straightforward reading of the text, cases
between states and foreign states.
Other evidence also shows that the phrase “[cases] in which a State shall
be a party” in Article III included cases between foreign states and U.S.
states. Attorney General Edmund Randolph issued a report on the federal
judiciary in 1790, at the request of the House of Representatives, in which he
proposed an entirely new judiciary act.153 It, too, put cases “in which a State
149. James Pfander has argued that the “all Cases” in the Original Jurisdiction Clause refers
not only to the “controversies” to which states are parties but also to the “cases” identified in
Article III, including those that arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States. James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 605 (1994). His interpretation is consistent with the Supreme
Court having original jurisdiction over cases between states and foreign states.
150. See generally Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
151. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based
Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1793 (2004).
152. Id. at 1792 (emphasis added) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. § 13
(1789)).
153. See generally Edmund Randolph, Report, in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 127 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter Randolph Report].
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shall be a party” within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(although without any exclusions), but unlike the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Randolph’s version did explicitly mention cases between states and foreign
states.154 It would have given circuit courts original jurisdiction over cases
“between a state, being a plaintiff, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens or subjects.”155 Note that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court does not, however, include another class of cases to which the judicial
power of the United States extends: cases between citizens of a state and a
foreign state.156 That exclusion from the Court’s original jurisdiction is
consistent with the ratification debates, which evinced particular concern for
cases between domestic and foreign states.157 The Court has twice assumed
that cases between “states” and “foreign states” come within the Court’s
original jurisdiction.158
What kinds of cases might arise between states and foreign states, to which
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would extend? There are
several possibilities. During the Revolutionary War, individual states
borrowed from foreign creditors, including from foreign nations.159 North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, for example, all borrowed from
France;160 the failure of North and South Carolina to retire those debts
apparently remained a diplomatic irritant through the 1780s as the
Constitution was drafted and enacted.161 The Principality of Monaco
invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction in a 1934 case against Mississippi
involving a state debt.162 Second, state laws permitted the confiscation of
British and loyalist property during the Revolutionary War. Although highprofile efforts to provide compensation were negotiated between the United
154. See generally id.
155. Id. at 148.
156. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
157. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); supra notes 136–40 and
accompanying text.
158. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831).
159. MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES TO
1914, at 29, 32 (1989); see also PIETER J. VAN WINTER, AMERICAN FINANCE AND DUTCH
INVESTMENT, 1780–1805, at 36–37 (1977) (noting the efforts of Virginia, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina to borrow money in Amsterdam).
Maryland resolved in 1781 to “get a loan from a European government or, failing that, from
private individuals” and secured a loan from a private Dutch firm in 1782. VAN WINTER,
supra, at 94–95. That debt was discussed at various times by the Maryland House of Delegates
until it was retired in 1793. WILKINS, supra, at 29, 47.
160. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775–
1789, at 506–07 (1969); B. U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 41–42 (1941).
161. See NEVINS, supra note 160, at 507 n.51 (noting that the “French Government grew
urgent in pressing for the repayment” of South Carolina’s debt); B. U. Ratchford, An
International Debt Settlement: The North Carolina Debt to France, 40 AM. HIST. REV. 63,
65–68 (1934) (describing the negotiations and efforts to repay North Carolina’s debt through
the 1780s); Southern Mails, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 24, 1789 (describing a demand by the King
of France that South Carolina repay its debt). See generally Hulsebosch, supra note 1, at 1249
(noting that the “European audiences for American constitution-making” were all “concerned
about debt”).
162. Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330.

660

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

States and Britain,163 cases between states and foreign states might have been
understood to include future situations in which state laws affected property
owned by foreigners and foreign governments sued on behalf of their
nationals.164 Third, the Constitution permits states to make an “Agreement
or Compact” with “a foreign power” if Congress so permits; conflicts related
to such agreements could be brought under the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.165 Fourth, the colonies had had various conflicts with Indian
nations, which might have been understood as “foreign states” within the
meaning of Article III. The Court held to the contrary in 1831 in a 5–2
decision.166
The foregoing discussion establishes that cases between states and foreign
states are within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is self-executing, unlike the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts. Nor is the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
subject to regulation by Congress, unlike its appellate jurisdiction.167 Cases
between a state and a foreign state are therefore within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, whether or not Congress so designates. It
does not matter that the current federal statute conferring original jurisdiction
does not include cases between states and foreign states.168
Using Article III to benefit foreign states in a certain class of cases is
entirely consistent with the general concern about conflict with foreign states
and with the specific reasons for creating a federal judiciary. It is also
consistent with other textual commitments of Article III, which reflect the
same concerns by extending the judicial power of the United States and the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to “Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls.”169
To be clear, the argument that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over cases between states and foreign states accepts that the Court may
decline to exercise its original jurisdiction.170 It is also consistent with the
claim that the parties must in some sense give their “consent” in order to be
sued. James Madison and John Marshall used this language, as we have
seen.171 A century and a half later, the Court held that a state cannot be sued
by a foreign state absent consent and it suggested that states may not sue
163. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116
(Jay Treaty).
164. Cf. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 285 (1822) (libel filed by the
Spanish consul on behalf of Spanish property owners).
165. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570–73 (1840). In terms of recent
practice, U.S. states have entered into at least 340 agreements with foreign states since 1955.
See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 750 (2010). Note
that cases based upon such agreements would not “arise under” a “treaty” because agreements
and compacts are constitutionally distinct from Article II treaties.
166. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831).
167. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66, 98 (1860).
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
170. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990, 990 (1988).
171. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.
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foreign states without their consent.172 As explained in Part III.A, “consent”
in this context plausibly refers to satisfying the conditions for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.173 Whether or not that is correct,
however, the point here is that should a state and a foreign state consent, if
(and in whatever manner) consent is constitutionally required, then the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over the case.
3. Personal Jurisdiction and Notice
The Constitution explicitly contemplates litigation involving foreign states
in federal courts. To what litigation-related constitutional rights, such as
notice and personal jurisdiction, are they entitled? We have already seen that
federal courts were created in part to provide a fair forum for litigating
disputes in which foreign countries had an interest so as to avoid conflict with
foreign nations. Having created a federal forum for this purpose, it would be
odd for those who enacted the Constitution to provide structural
disadvantages to foreign sovereigns by creating litigation-related
constitutional rights that benefitted only private parties. Today’s prevailing
understanding of the Fifth Amendment does exactly that: it constitutionally
disadvantages foreign sovereigns as compared to private parties. Prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, foreign states and private parties
would have been on equal footing in state court (neither type of party
protected by due process), but in federal court, foreign states would have had
fewer protections than private litigants. Disadvantaging foreign sovereigns
in this way seems contrary to the purpose of Article III as articulated during
the founding period. It is also wrong in ways that change our understanding
of the rights of both foreign sovereigns and of private parties, as well as those
of SOEs.
Procedural protections are usually understood as a function of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth or, here, the Fifth Amendment. Focusing
on foreign sovereigns uncovers an additional, largely unexplored source of
litigation-related constitutional rights in federal courts: Article III’s grant of
“judicial power,” which extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” The
term “controversy” likely refers to a subset of “cases,” thus the term “case”
is used here to refer to both cases and controversies.174 The terms “cases”
and “judicial power” in Article III are limiting. They mean that the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is triggered only when certain

172. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
173. See infra notes 326–27 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 120, 149 and accompanying text; see also Randolph Report, supra
note 153, at 129, 131, 140 (repeatedly using the word “cases” to refer to all ten classes of
jurisdiction named in Article III). Scholars have argued that the terms “case” and
“controversy” differed in various ways that are not relevant here. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 450 (1993). Pushaw notes that controversies, like cases “had to be
brought according to proper judicial procedure,” consistent with the argument advanced here.
Id. at 483 n.183.
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procedural prerequisites are met.175 Those prerequisites include personal
jurisdiction and notice for all defendants.
The text of Article III extends federal “judicial power” only to “cases in
law and equity.” Not surprisingly, the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts has always been limited to “cases.”176 In Osborn v. Bank of
the United States,177 Chief Justice John Marshall explained that Article III’s
“judicial power” is “capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to
it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then
becomes a case . . . .”178 Justice Joseph Story echoed this language in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.179 When a question
has assumed “such a form, that the judicial power is capable of acting upon
it,” Story wrote, “it then becomes a case; and then, and not till then, the
judicial power attaches to it.”180
The term “case” as used in the Constitution referred to a dispute or
question submitted in the proper procedural posture.181 The basic idea is a
familiar one in the context of standing: cases and controversies limit Article
III courts to hearing disputes that take a particular form.182 But Justice
Marshall’s words “form prescribed by law”183 link the terms “case” and
“judicial power” to proper “form” or procedure.184 Justice Story made the
same point using slightly different language in which he described a case as
“a suit in law or equity, instituted according to the regular course of judicial
proceedings.”185 Federal courts have no constitutional power to act outside
of “cases” instituted through regular “judicial proceedings.”
175. The Supreme Court has reasoned with respect to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that “the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not
from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The reasoning about Article III was not explained,
however, and it is incorrect for the reasons set out here. To the extent the Court meant that
Article III does not itself impose the rules of personal jurisdiction, as opposed to requiring that
personal jurisdiction exist under whatever rules are applicable, the statement is consistent with
the argument advanced here. See infra Part III.A.
176. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
177. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
178. Id. at 819.
179. See generally 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (Boston, Billiard, Gray & Co. 1833).
180. Id. § 1640; see also Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819 (noting that “the judicial
department” can “receive jurisdiction” when questions “assume such a form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on it”).
181. See Pushaw, supra note 174, at 473 (arguing that an Article III “‘case’ arose only if a
plaintiff’s claim fit within a recognized form of action and the parties complied with
procedural rules”).
182. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819.
183. Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 24, at 95 (“A case in law or equity was a term well
understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between parties which had taken
a shape for judicial decision.”).
184. Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 45, 84–85, 103 (1801) (linking notice to the term
“in the form prescribed by law”).
185. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405 (1821) (“If the question cannot be
brought into a Court, then there is no case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the
words of the article.”); STORY, supra note 179, § 1640.
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The word “case” does not appear to have had a precise, technical meaning,
however.186 It was a very commonly used legal term in the late eighteenth
century and had a number of definitions.187 In particular, the word “case”
overlapped in meaning with the words “suit” and “cause.” Article III uses
“case”;188 the Judiciary Act of 1789 sometimes used “case” but often used
the word “suit” and sometimes the word “cause”;189 Randolph’s report on
the judiciary sometimes used the word “case” in contexts in which the First
Judiciary Act used the word “suit”;190 and the Eleventh Amendment uses
“suit” not “case.”191 The comparison among these three documents is
instructive because they choose different terms to refer to the same or very
similar concepts relating to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article
III. Their language reveals overlaps in meaning, but the terms “suit” and
“case” were not used entirely interchangeably. The word “suit” was
associated with the initiation or beginning of an action, as in the Eleventh
Amendment in which the word “suit” is coupled with the terms
“commenced” or “prosecuted.”192 Cases, by contrast, included “cause[s]”
186. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 231 (1990).
187. For example, the term “case” referred to an “action upon the case” which meant a
“universal remedy given for all personal wrongs and injuries with force; so called, because the
plaintiff’s whole case or cause of complaint is set forth at length in the original writ.” 1
RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 143–45 (London, T. Cadell 1791); see also 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122.
188. U.S. CONST. art. III.
189. For example, the Constitution extends the judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction.” Id. § 2. Whereas, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the district courts
“exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. The Randolph Report proposed conferring
upon the district courts “original jurisdiction” of “all civil cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.” Randolph Report, supra note 153, at 141. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 begins: “And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance”
of all suits of a civil nature where “the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another State.” Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11.
190. For example, the Randolph Report would have given district courts original
jurisdiction over “controversies to which the United States shall be a party plaintiff.” Randolph
Report, supra note 153, at 141. But the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted district courts
concurrent jurisdiction “of all suits at common law where the United States sue.” Judiciary
Act of 1789 § 9; see also id. § 11 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance . . . of
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where . . . the United States are
plaintiffs.”).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
192. Id.; see also Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11 (“And no civil suit shall be brought . . . against
an inhabitant of the United States . . . nor shall any district or circuit court have cognizance of
any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note . . . .”); § 12 (“[I]f a suit be commenced
in any state court against an alien . . . .”); § 13 (“[J]urisdiction of suits or proceedings against
ambassadors” and “of all suits brought by ambassadors”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 187, at
*23 (“[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.”); 2 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW
DICTIONARY (London, S. Crowder 1765) (unpaginated) (noting that “suit” signifies “a suit in
law, and is divided into real and personal, and is all one with action real and personal.”);
Randolph Report, supra note 153, at 142 (“No civil suit . . . shall be brought against an
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which “ha[d] been decided”193 and generally referred to suits or actions that
had already commenced.194 That general distinction supports the claim that
the word “case” referred not to the legal demand or cause of action but only
to a demand or cause correctly presented to the court.
A “case” required that a dispute be submitted in proper form, a requirement
that included bringing the defendant before the court. As John Marshall
explained in 1800, to have a “case” there “must be parties to come into court,
who can be reached by its process.”195 An attempt to exercise personal or in
rem jurisdiction that exceeded the authority of the court was “against the
form of the laws”—the language linked to the word “case”—and such a
dispute did not come within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts.196 James Madison made the same point at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention when he argued that subject matter jurisdiction over cases
involving “citizens of different States” will not “go beyond the cases where
they may be parties.”197 In this sense, subject matter jurisdiction is limited
by personal jurisdiction, as Caleb Nelson has argued in the context of cases
against U.S. states.198 The term “judicial power” shared this meaning,
providing additional support for Nelson’s argument that the immunity of U.S.
states was understood as an aspect of personal jurisdiction that was preserved
by Article III.
The “judicial power” conferred by Article III extended only to “cases”
(and controversies), suggesting, as described above, a power that was limited
to regular or lawful proceedings. The vesting of “judicial power” itself—
arguably the “only explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary’s

inhabitant of the United States . . . . No district court shall have cognizance of any suit, to
recover the contents of any promissory note . . . .”).
193. Case, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28393?
p=emailAkGB4tVK4aci.&d=28393 [https://perma.cc/N4FS-5K6A] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
(referring to a 1710 work, H. Prideaux’s The Original and Right of Tithes, which included this
sentence: “[p]recedents and judged Cases have ever had the like authority”).
194. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (noting that the suit
exists before the “case” and that the suit does not become a case unless properly submitted so
that the court has jurisdiction); Randolph Report, supra note 153, at 142 (“[I]f it shall appear
to the said court that due notice and sufficient time have been given to the officers of the
United States concerned, to prepare for the hearing, and that the circuit courts herein after
mentioned, have not already had possession of the case . . . .”).
195. Marshall, supra note 24, at 95–96; see also Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77,
77, 79–80 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1781) (linking “process” with personal jurisdiction over
ambassadors, U.S. states, and foreign states and stating, “[h]ence this inference was drawn,
that the court having no jurisdiction over Virginia, all its process against that state, must be
coram non judice, and consequently void”); infra Part II.B.1.
196. United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 124 (1795) (argument of counsel)
(describing counsel’s argument regarding invalid exercise of personal and in rem jurisdiction
as “against the form of the laws of the United States” and ordering the case dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173,
186 (1809) (linking “in the form prescribed by law” to an accused “amenable to its
jurisdiction,” in contrast to proceedings against someone the court has “no power to try” which
are “coram non judice”).
197. The Virginia Convention Friday 20 June 1788, supra note 132, at 1414.
198. See generally Nelson, supra note 23.
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authority to act”199—also brings with it personal jurisdiction-based
limitations. A “judicial” decision presupposed a question that took legal
form or shape,200 which included parties who could be reached by the court’s
process.201
Judicial power was, at least for much of English history, part of the
executive power. The king had the “coercive power” to punish and also the
“power to compel the parties to come to judgment and to execute the
judgment given.”202 As Coke’s influential commentary on Thomas de
Littleton put it: “The law is the rule, but it is mute. The king judgeth by his
judges, and they are the speaking law, lex loquens. The process and the
execution, which is the life of the law, consisteth in the king’s writs.”203
Coke thus equates “process and the execution” with the “life of the law”
and the “king’s writ,” but he equates judging with “speaking the law.”204
Both were aspects of executive authority. Even as the English function of
judging or “speaking the law” became increasingly independent from
executive power—a much slower process than the separation of legislative
and executive power205—judicial authority remained dependent upon the
distinct power to summon parties through “process.” A century later,
William Blackstone would describe courts as having three “constituent
parts”: the actor (or plaintiff), “reus” or the defendant, and “the judex, or
judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law

199. Steven G. Calabresi, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176–77 (1992).
200. See cf. Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (opinion of Jay, C.J.);
Marshall, supra note 24, at 95–96 (“[A] question must assume legal form, for forensic
litigation, and judicial decision.”). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir.
2001) (“The judicial power clause, by contrast, has never before been thought to encompass a
constitutional limitation on how courts conduct their business.”).
201. See, e.g., Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188, 1190 (C.C.D. Vt. 1835) (No.
13,341) (“And no court can, in the ordinary administration of justice in common law
proceedings, exercise jurisdiction over a party, unless he shall voluntarily appear, or is found
within the jurisdiction of the court so as to be served with process. Such process cannot reach
the party beyond the territorial jurisdiction.”).
202. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 179, 191 (D.E.C. Yale ed.,
1976) (“Coercion is that whereby the judicative power is acted and without which there can
be no jurisdiction, and whereby the king upon complaint either of a particular man or of a
country, as by indictment, or of his attorney, may enforce the person complained of to come
to judgment and to execute it.”). On the general influence of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone on
the American founders, see Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1181, 1252–53 (2016).
203. 3 J. H. THOMAS, SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE’S FIRST INSTITUTE ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 308 (Philadelphia, Alexander Towar 1836).
204. See also Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article
III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1053–54 (1998) (“The very word ‘judicial’ derives ultimately
from jus dicere, Latin for ‘to speak the law.’ The judicial power is an official ‘speaking of the
law’ to other parties so as to resolve a dispute between them.”).
205. Blackstone describes government as having two parts: legislative and executive.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 187, at *122.
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arising upon that fact.”206 Here, too, the judicial power speaks the law but
only once the “reus” is there to listen.207
The distinction between an “original” writ and a “judicial” writ is
illustrative. An original writ was sent out to summon the defendant in order
to “begin the suit,” while judicial writs were sent out only “after the suit
begun.”208 A “judicial” writ was used after the defendant had been properly
summoned. The issuance of the original writ and summons based upon it
were necessary to compel the defendant to appear.209 The summons, based
upon the original writ, did not, however, itself provide the basis for a default
judgment. A variety of writs developed over time to compel the appearance
of the defendant, such as the mesne writs of attachment, distringas, and capias
ad respondendum.210 These writs, called writs of process,211 were
judicial.212 The point is thus not that judicial writs could only be exercised
after a defendant was otherwise properly before the court but instead that the
exercise of judicial power required that particular procedures be followed
prior to its invocation (the issuance of the original writ and summons) and
that those procedures were in theory necessary213 (if not sufficient) to obtain
the personal jurisdiction needed for a valid judgment.
The connection between “judicial power” and personal jurisdiction is
made clear in a 1799 opinion of Attorney General Charles Lee on whether
process could be served upon a person on board a British warship docked in
New York Harbor. The attorney general reasoned that
206. Id. at *25.
207. See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 352–53 (1822) (linking “judicial
process” to those who can “be compelled to appear in our Courts”); JOHN AYLIFFE, PARERGON
JURIS CANONICI ANGLICANI 176 (London, Thomas Osborne 2d ed. 1734) (describing a citation
as a form of summons and then noting that “a Citation is the Beginning and Foundation of
every Law-Suit or Judicial Proceeding: so that every Judicial Act exercised against a Person
not cited, is null and void . . . .”). The citation itself was not, however, a judicial act. AYLIFFE,
supra, at 181; see also Kirk v. Williams’ Ex’x, 18 Ky. (2 T.B. Mon.) 135, 136 (1825)
(describing the exercise of “judicial functions” as dependent upon parties “brought before the
court by appropriate process, or [who] voluntarily submit to its cognizance”).
208. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 192 (unpaginated); see also GILES JACOB, A NEW LAWDICTIONARY (London, Henry Lintot 6th ed. 1750) (unpaginated) (providing a similar
definition of “Writ”).
209. Cf. 2 ARTHUR BROWN, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF
IRELAND 11 (Dublin, R. E. Mercier 1803) (distinguishing between “voluntary jurisdiction”
which was exercised “in matters which require no judicial proceeding” and “contentious
jurisdiction” in which there is “an action or judicial process”); see also BURN, supra note 187,
at 205–06 (drawing the same distinction in ecclesiastical cases); DOROTHEA DU BOIS, THE
CASE OF ANN COUNTESS OF ANGLESEY 26 (London, 1766) (noting that an attorney general is
“vested with no judicial Power, and could not, by any compulsive Process, compel Witnesses
to appear before him . . .”).
210. See Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the
Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 58–60 (1968).
211. See HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
ACTIONS 24 (Cambridge, Harvard Law Review Publ’g Ass’n 1895).
212. Levy, supra note 210, at 58–60; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 187, at *281–82.
213. The original writs involved “expense and delay” and a variety of methods were
developed that permitted the issuance of certain judicial writs without the need for an original
writ. H. A. Hollond, Writs and Bills, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 15, 26 (1942). Many of these methods
depend upon the fiction that an original writ had issued. Id. at 22, 26.
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[i]t may be assumed, as a doctrine perfectly and incontrovertibly
established, that the judicial power of a nation extends to every person and
every thing in its territory, excepting only such foreigners as enjoy the right
of extraterritoriality, and who, consequently, are not looked upon as
temporary subjects of the State.214

The judicial power extends to persons and things in the territory of the
state—that is, to persons and things over which the court has jurisdiction.
The attorney general returns to the “judiciary power” later in the opinion,
describing it as “one of the most essential rights in the hands of the
sovereign” and noting that it “extends indiscriminately to all who are in the
territory, and the sovereign is only the source of it; but it must be remembered
that there are persons whose extraterritoriality exempts them from this
jurisdiction, such as foreign princes and their ministers.”215 The judicial
power extends as far as personal jurisdiction and no farther. The “exception”
to jurisdiction mentioned by the attorney general would soon be given a
name: immunity.216
Another way to see the overlooked connection between judicial power and
personal jurisdiction is to consider the term coram non judice. As the
Supreme Court has reasoned in a modern personal jurisdiction case:
The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void
traces back to the English Year Books and was made settled law by Lord
Coke in Case of the Marshalsea. Traditionally that proposition was
embodied in the phrase coram non judice, “before a person not a judge”—
meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial
proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could
therefore not yield a judgment. American courts invalidated, or denied
recognition to, judgments that violated this common-law principle long
before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.217

A decision issued by a court that lacks personal jurisdiction is coram non
judice,218 meaning that the proceeding was not a judicial proceeding at all.219
As the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Burnham v. Superior Court220 makes
clear, the idea that the exercise of judicial power depended upon the parties
properly before the Court is an ancient one. Coram non judice was used
214. Serv. of Process on a British Ship-of-War, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 87, 88 (1799); see also
infra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
215. Serv. of Process, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 88 (quoting Georg Friedrich von Martens).
216. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138–40 (1812); infra
notes 252–59 and accompanying text.
217. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608–09 (1990) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (plurality
opinion).
218. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878); Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188,
1190 (C.C.D. Vt. 1835) (No. 13,341); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273, 274–75 (1835).
219. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 599, 600–01 (1840) (“Did then the petition,
affidavit, & c., present a case for the exercise of the judicial power of the Circuit Court, or was
it a matter coram non judice, is the question . . . .”); A LETTER FROM A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS IN IRELAND TO A GENTLEMAN OF THE LONG-ROBE IN ENGLAND 24 (London, J.
Roberts 1720) (equating the term “coram non judice” with lack of “judicial power”).
220. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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interchangeably to refer both to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to lack
of personal jurisdiction because either defect left courts with no “judicial”
power.221 Note that the actual rules of personal jurisdiction might be external
to Article III (and the Constitution as a whole) and supplied by general law
or international law but that Article III might nevertheless require that those
rules be satisfied.222
Notice was often described as a fundamental aspect of “judicial” power,
suggesting that notice, like jurisdiction, is a condition of the exercise of the
“judicial power of the United States” under Article III.223 A variety of
sources link notice and “judicial” authority or power. Chief Justice Marshall
reasoned, for example, that “it is a principle of natural justice, of universal
obligation, that before the rights of an individual be bound by a judicial
sentence, he shall have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings
against him.”224 Justice Story described an in rem seizure and condemnation
made without notice of the proceedings as “not so much a judicial sentence,
as an arbitrary sovereign edict. It has none of the elements of a judicial
proceeding.”225 These sources link notice to “judicial” power and suggest
that the exercise of judicial power presupposed notice. As with personal
jurisdiction, if Article III requires notice, it might be that other laws—
statutes, general law, natural law—determined the kind of notice that was
required.226 In any event, the service of process requirements generally
ensured that defendants were notified of the suit, and early cases did not draw
sharp distinctions between notice and personal jurisdiction.227
The exercise of judicial power—the power to “speak the law”—was
dependent upon parties who could be brought before the court. There needed
to be someone to speak to, and the power that compelled people to appear
was not necessarily a “judicial” power. Stated another way, without process
that could bring the defendant before the court, the entire event was not
judicial at all—it was coram non judice. The judicial power vested by Article
221. Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 483, 539 (1835) (“As to these persons, there was
no case in this court, it could have no appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine on any thing,
and the proceeding was wholly coram non judice, unless it could exercise original jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter, as a case originating in this court.”); Nathan v. Virginia,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77, 78 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1781) (“[T]he court having no jurisdiction over
Virginia, all its process against that state must be coram non judice, and consequently void.”).
222. See infra Part III.A.
223. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Hamilton v. Blackwood (1761) (Scot.), in 3 DECISIONS OF
THE COURT OF SESSION 101, 102 (Edinburgh, Elphingston Balfour 1792) (noting that “[in]
Scotland, our ancestors were particularly careful, that full time and repeated notice should be
given to the defender to bring him[self] into court before any judicial proceeding could go on
against him”).
224. The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815); see Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65, 76
(1847) (“A proceeding professing to determine the right of property, where no notice, actual,
or constructive, is given, whatever else it might be called, would not be entitled to be dignified
with the name of a judicial proceeding.”); see also T.B. Young & Co. v. Steamboat Va., 12
Ohio Dec. Reprint 77, 78 (Super. Ct. 1854) (similar).
225. Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1793).
226. See infra Part III.A.
227. See Effron, supra note 27, at 34 (arguing that “pre-Pennoyer cases had not taken care
to erect a strong or formal distinction between personal jurisdiction and notice”).
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III had personal jurisdiction and notice defenses baked into it. If the
defendant could not be reached, there was no case and no occasion for the
exercise of judicial power. Although today we associate notice and personal
jurisdiction with due process, recall that Alexander Hamilton and others
insisted that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary because it duplicated the
Constitution’s structural limitations on federal power.228 Article III already
required personal jurisdiction and notice.
4. Litigation Against Sovereigns—Domestic and Foreign
Cases against both domestic and foreign states during the founding period
illustrate the relationship between personal and subject matter jurisdiction.229
They also illustrate that the foreign states raised personal jurisdiction
defenses, understood as defects in process (to use the term that Coke and
many others did), which left the court without judicial power and without a
“case.” The use of the term “process” in these cases illustrates the
relationship between “due process” and personal jurisdiction, an argument
developed below in Part II.B.
Before the enactment of the Constitution, a Pennsylvania state court, in
Nathan v. Virginia,230 considered whether Virginia could be sued based upon
a “foreign attachment” in Philadelphia of a “quantity of cloathing, imported
from France, belonging to that state.”231 The suit was in personam; “the
goods were attached merely to compel the party’s appearance to answer the
plaintiff’s demand.”232 Virginia argued that “no sovereign would submit to
the indignity of doing this.”233 The court agreed and discharged the writ
against Virginia. The argument of counsel described the Pennsylvania
court’s lack of “jurisdiction over Virginia” as meaning that “all its process
against that state, must be coram non judice, and consequently void,”234
underscoring the relationship between process and judicial power. The
arguments in Nathan also sounded other themes that have remained salient
for the two and a half centuries since: whether foreign states and U.S. states
should be treated in similar ways for personal jurisdiction purposes (although
today we use the term immunity);235 whether a state becomes amenable to
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]hy declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do?”); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 271 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (“[I]n
a certain degree . . . the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal
powers are granted.”).
229. For a general overview of early foreign affairs cases before the Supreme Court, see
Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 903 tbl.14 (2005).
230. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1781).
231. Id. at 77–78.
232. Id. at 79.
233. Id.
234. Id. The parties agreed that a suit against the property itself, had it been imported
contrary to law, could go forward, “the sovereignty of Virginia notwithstanding.” Id.
235. See, e.g., California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 507 (1998) (noting that
the actual possession rule for sovereign immunity in admiralty cases applies whether the
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the personal jurisdiction of another state if it “turns merchant”;236 and, the
extent to which sovereign property located in the territory of another
sovereign provides the basis for personal jurisdiction.237
Just over a decade later, the Supreme Court considered whether, after the
enactment of the Constitution, suits against states could go forward in federal
courts. In other words, did Article III change the outcome of Nathan so that
federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over domestic states? In
Chisholm v. Georgia,238 the Court said yes. In one sense, the outcome was
not surprising. By creating a federal judiciary, the Constitution changed the
relationship between judicial power and territory. As U.S. Attorney General
Randolph argued:
[W]here the effects, or property, of one Prince are rested in the dominions
of another, the proprietor Prince may be summoned before a tribunal of
that other. Now, although, each State has its separate territory, in one sense,
the whole is that of the United States, in another. The jurisdiction of this
Court reaches to Georgia, as well as to Philadelphia. If therefore, the
process could be commenced in rem, the authority of Bynkershoek would
justify us; and whether it be commenced in rem, or in personam, the
principle of amenability is equally avowed.239

Another reason for subjecting Georgia to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, as Justice James Wilson reasoned, is that dishonest states, like
dishonest merchants, ought to be “amenable to a Court of Justice.”240 This
reasoning, also raised in Nathan v. Virginia, eventually led to a significant
change in the international law governing state-to-state relations in the area
of what would come to be known as the law of immunity. More specifically,
Justice Wilson’s point that states should sometimes be treated like merchants
provided the basis for the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity in the
twentieth century.
Domestic states could unquestionably be plaintiffs in federal courts. The
defendant in Chisholm v. Georgia argued that the text of Article III that
extended jurisdiction in controversies between “a state” and certain other
parties did not extend to situations in which the state was a defendant.241 This
argument was rejected, in part because
[i]t is extended also, to controversies between a State and foreign States;
and if the argument taken from the order of designation were good, it would
be meant here, that this Court might have cognizance of a suit, where a
State is Plaintiff, and some foreign State a Defendant, but not where a
sovereign is a U.S. state, a foreign state, or the U.S. government); see also David J. Bederman,
The “Common-Law Regime” of Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The Actual Possession Rule in
Admiralty, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 853, 860–62 (2011).
236. See Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 79; HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY 532–39 (2008) (discussing the historical development of the commercial-activity
exception to foreign sovereign immunity).
237. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)–(4) (2012).
238. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
239. Id. at 425–26 (argument of counsel).
240. Id. at 456 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
241. Id. at 420–21 (argument of counsel).
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foreign State brings a suit against a State. This . . . seems to lose sight of
the policy which, no doubt, suggested this provision, viz. That no State in
the Union should, by withholding justice, have it in its power to embroil
the whole confederacy in disputes of another nature.242

In other words, “the policy” which “suggested” putting cases involving
foreign states within federal judicial power was a policy that should not
disadvantage foreign states when they appear in federal court.243
The critical reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia focused on whether Georgia
(and other states) could be reached by process.244 Article III, critics said, did
not override personal jurisdiction defenses available to domestic states.245 A
stronger version of the same argument applied to foreign states because,
unlike domestic states, foreign states had not relinquished any aspects of
sovereignty to the federal government.
As the Eleventh Amendment was being ratified to overrule Chisholm v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court in United States v. Peters246 considered the fate
of the Cassius, “an armed Corvette belonging to the French Republic,” which
had been attached based on allegations that it had unlawfully taken an
American vessel as prize.247 The Supreme Court ordered the release of the
vessel and its master, a French naval lieutenant, because the validity of prizes
made by the French Republic fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
“tribunals and judiciary establishments” of France.248 The law of nations and
treaties provided that “the vessels of war belonging to the said French
Republic, and the officers commanding the same” cannot “be arrested,
seized, attached, or detained, in the ports of the United States, by process of
law, at the suit or instance of individuals, to answer for” captures made on
the high seas. International law, in other words, created an exemption from
personal jurisdiction.249 Litigants described this limitation as an “exemption
of sovereigns” from “process,” one that prevented the attachment of the
sovereign’s property and rendered the “process out of the District Court”
“against the form of the laws of the United States.”250 Article III, counsel
argued, kept in place the personal jurisdiction limitations that prevented
courts from resolving cases against foreign nations.251 The Court agreed.
The foregoing cases laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s more
famous decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,252 in which the
242. Id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.).
243. Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
244. See Nelson, supra note 23, at 1599 (arguing, based on extensive evidence, that “[t]he
states’ reactions to Chisholm confirm the link between sovereign immunity and compulsory
process”).
245. See id. at 1601.
246. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).
247. Id. at 121–22. See generally Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign
Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704, 733 (2012).
248. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 129–30 (opinion of Rutledge, C.J.).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 124, 127.
251. Id. at 127.
252. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear a case brought by an
American asserting title to a French public warship located in
Philadelphia.253 Just as in Peters (the case involving the Cassius), the
plaintiff argued that Article III expressly gave the courts of the United States
subject matter jurisdiction in cases between citizens and foreign states and
that the conferral of subject matter jurisdiction lifted personal jurisdiction
defenses.254 The plaintiff’s argument was answered by the U.S. attorney
general in this way: “[t]he constitution of the United States, decides
nothing—it only provides, a tribunal, if a case can possibly exist.”255 The
response makes clear that by conferring subject matter on the federal courts,
the Constitution did not override personal jurisdiction defenses of foreign
states. It also makes clear that a “case” exists only if there is personal
jurisdiction. Although the scope of personal jurisdiction was different for
private defendants than it was for sovereign defendants, the underlying
relationship applies equally to individual defendants: if the court cannot
compel the defendant’s presence, there is no Article III “case.”256 Like The
Schooner Exchange itself, other cases involving the authority of the federal
courts used the term “jurisdiction” to refer to both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, and they often did not distinguish between the two.257
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that the state
court had reached in Nathan v. Virginia: the sovereign was not amenable to
process in the foreign forum, although the sovereign’s property was located
there.258
The Schooner Exchange opinion spoke in broad terms about the
“immunity” of foreign vessels, using terminology that would quickly become
a core doctrine of public international law.259 Not surprisingly, it also
generated cases designed to test the limits of its broad language. In La
Nereyda,260 for example, the Spanish consul alleged that the vessel in
question was a Spanish public armed vessel that had been captured by a
Venezuelan privateer in violation of U.S. neutrality.261 The prize was
253. See id.
254. Id. at 130.
255. Id. at 133.
256. See supra Part II.A.3.
257. See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134)
(discussing both subject matter and personal jurisdiction using only the word “jurisdiction”
and without distinguishing between the two); see also United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
8, 13 (1835) (similar). See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
258. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 142 (asking whether a private
vessel not attempting to trade “would become amenable to the local jurisdiction”); id. at 144
(“[N]ations have not yet asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign
sovereign . . . .”); id. at 145 (“A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country,
may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction . . . .”);
see also id. at 130 (argument of counsel) (“You cannot draw to your jurisdiction those who
owe you neither a local nor an absolute allegiance, but you may enquire into the validity of
every claim to a thing within your jurisdiction.”).
259. See generally FOX & WEBB, supra note 237.
260. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108 (1823).
261. See generally id.
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condemned by the Venezuelan government, given to its captors, outfitted as
a privateer on behalf of Venezuela, and sailed to Baltimore where it was
libeled by the Spanish consul. The prize master argued that privateers—
licensed as they were by a sovereign—should be immune from suit just like
public war vessels.262 The Court held the vessel amenable to suit because
the capture allegedly violated U.S. neutrality.
Questions also arose about the immunity of cargo, rather than of the vessel
itself. The Court held in The Santissima Trinidad 263 that the exemption of
the vessel from jurisdiction notwithstanding, “the prize property which she
brings into our ports is liable to the jurisdiction of our Courts.”264 The Court
also considered whether a condemnation of the prize property by a court in
Buenos Aires while the suit was pending deprived the court of jurisdiction.
The Court reasoned that, “[b]y the seizure and possession of the property,
under the process of the District Court, the possession of the captors was
devested, and the property was emphatically placed in the custody of the
law.”265 Thus, no other court can, “by its adjudication, rightfully take away
its jurisdiction, or forestall and defeat its judgment. It would be an attempt
to exercise a sovereign authority over the Court having possession of the
thing, and take from the nation the right of vindicating its own justice and
neutrality.”266 Notice the link between the process that brings the property
within the “custody of the law” and the power to adjudicate, i.e., exercise its
judicial power. The language draws the same distinction made by Coke
almost three centuries earlier.
Finally, consider a case brought pursuant to an 1819 treaty between the
United States and Spain. Although not brought by Spain itself, the case
involved claimants who benefited from U.S. obligations to Spain under the
treaty. Congress designated a commissioner to resolve such claims and gave
the power of review to the secretary of the treasury. The Supreme Court
described the work of the commissioners as “judicial in . . . nature” because
“judgment and discretion must be exercised.” But it is not “judicial” in the
sense in which “judicial power” is “granted by the Constitution to the courts
of the United States” because “there is to be no suit; no parties in the legal
acceptance of the term, are to be made—no process to issue; and no one is
authorized to appear on behalf of the United States, or to summon witnesses
in the case.”267 Once again, judicial power presupposed “parties,” meaning
those who could be reached by process.
B. Foreign States and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
Article III’s conferral of “judicial power” over “cases” means that federal
courts must have personal jurisdiction and must give notice to all defendants,
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 129–30.
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355.
Id.
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46–48 (1851).
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whether or not they are protected by due process. The Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause also protects foreign states, however. Early cases against
foreign states show that they were entitled to “process” and that they were
understood as “persons.” The historical analysis of cases against foreign
states connects the term “process” to personal jurisdiction limitations for all
defendants and clarifies the general relationship between due process and
personal jurisdiction.
1. “Process” and Personal Jurisdiction
The Fifth Amendment protects a “person” from deprivations of “property”
without “due process of law.”268 The “process” to which a defendant was
“due” in federal court included (but was not necessarily limited to) that
centuries-old prerequisite for judicial power: the literal issuance of
“process.” As Blackstone described it, “process” is the means of compelling
the defendant to appear in court.269 The word “process” “referred to those
writs which summoned parties to appear in court as well as those by which
execution of judgments was carried out.”270 Not surprisingly, “due process”
entitled one to “process,” which meant that one had to be properly summoned
to appear.271
An early English statute which includes the phrase used in the Fifth
Amendment, “due process of law,” is illustrative: “[t]hat no man of what
Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of land or Tenement, nor
taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due process of law.”272
The “due process of law” must bring the defendant in to “answer,” which
is required before a man loses his liberty or property. The term “due process”
is specified later in the same statute to mean “by Attachment and Distress,
and by Exigent, if need be.”273 These terms referred to particular writs,274
which, like process itself, were limited by the territorial reach of sovereign
power. Because “process” was limited by territory and because defendants
sometimes did not appear, English law developed creative ways to coerce
268. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
269. Blackstone’s influential Commentaries on the Laws of England identifies “process”
as “the method taken by the law to compel a compliance with the original writ, of which the
primary step is by giving the party notice to obey it.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 187, at *279.
The notice was given “by Summons . . . to the defendant by two of the sheriff’s messengers
called Summoners.” Id.
270. Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process
of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 272 (1975).
271. See New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, DAILY
ADVERTISER, Feb. 8, 1787, in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 34, 35 (Harold C.
Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962) (“The words ‘due process’ have a precise technical
import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice . . . .”).
See generally Nelson, supra note 23, at 1568–74 (describing the various forms of “process”
used to obtain jurisdiction and to compel a defendant to appear, a necessary prerequisite for
the issuance of a judgment).
272. Jurow, supra note 270, at 266 (quoting Liberty of Subject 1354, 28 Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.)).
273. Id. at 267.
274. Id.
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defendants to appear by, for example, acting upon their property or through
outlawry.275 Judgment depended upon “process,” which was limited by the
territorial limits on sovereign power, or by what we now call “personal
jurisdiction,” clarifying the now-obscure relationship between the two.276
The connections between “process,” personal jurisdiction, and the
territorial limits of sovereign power are clear from the 1799 opinion of the
U.S. attorney general in the case involving service of process on an individual
aboard a British public war vessel docked in New York Harbor.277 The
attorney general linked “judicial power” and personal jurisdiction,278 and he
also explained that “process” only extends as far as territory and that
“[a]ccording to the general rule established by these citations, every ship,
even a public ship-of-war of a foreign nation, at anchor in the harbor of New
York, is within the territory of the State of New York, and subject to the
service of judicial process.”279

275. See Levy, supra note 210, at 84–87 (describing “outlawry” and other methods to reach
the defendants who were “beyond the reach of process”); see also An Act for Making Process
in Courts of Equity Effectual Against Persons Who Abscond 1732, 5 Geo. 2 c. 25 (Gr. Brit.)
(stating that, if a defendant against whom “process” shall issue does not enter an appearance
and could not be found because he absconded to avoid being “served with such process,”
courts may take the bill pro confesso); 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 193 (Windham, John Byrne 1795) (observing England’s “very
lengthy and circuitous mode of process, to compel the appearance of the defendant,”
contrasted with the Connecticut practice of issuing “writ” and “declaration” simultaneously,
making default judgments possible without a first appearance).
276. One scholar has described the connection in this way: “English and American law,
unlike continental law, made jurisdiction contingent on service of process—in particular, on
personal delivery to the defendant.” Conison, supra note 27, at 1111. But the relationship
went in both directions: process was contingent upon jurisdiction. As the cases against foreign
sovereigns made clear, if the court lacked power or jurisdiction over the defendant, process
could not be served.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 214–16. See generally Serv. of Process on a
British Ship-of-War, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 87, 88 (1799).
278. The attorney general used the term “jurisdiction” to refer to personal jurisdiction,
which was territorial and was limited to where process could be served. He wrote:
One of the most essential rights in the hands of the sovereign, is the judiciary power.
It extends indiscriminately to all who are in the territory, and the sovereign only is
the source of it; but it must be remembered that there are persons whose
extraterritoriality exempts them from this jurisdiction, such as foreign princes and
their ministers, with their retinue.
Serv. of Process, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 88 (citation omitted); see also Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.
Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (“[N]o sovereignty can extend its process
beyond its territorial limits, to subject persons or property to its judicial decisions.”);
M’Connell v. Johnston (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 167, 167 (allowing an assumpsit action to
proceed because “one of the plaintiffs [was] within the jurisdiction of the Court, and within
reach of its process”); Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1139 (“[T]hough
impossible to inforce the decree in rem, but the party being in England, I could inforce it by
process of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is the proper jurisdiction of this
court.”); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 281–82 (London, R.
Gosling 1721) (discussing territorial limits on process in criminal cases).
279. Serv. of Process, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 88–89; see also Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 393, 394 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1788) (noting that the Defendant was amenable to suit in
Connecticut because he “remained an inhabitant of Connecticut, and has always had property
there,” making him “liable to legal process”).
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2. Foreign States as “Persons”
Having made the connection between the word “process” in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and jurisdiction over the defendant,
the next steps are to show that those “process” protections extended to
foreign states and that foreign states would have been understood as
“persons.” The language from the 1799 opinion of the attorney general
quoted above asks whether “process” reached foreign states or their property.
Other sources used similar language.280 These sources also reaffirm that
process only reached those defendants over whom the court had power or, in
other words, jurisdiction. That connection is especially clear in cases
involving foreign sovereigns because they or their property might be located
in the United States, but nevertheless “process” could not reach them because
the sovereign (the United States) lacked power or jurisdiction over them.
“Process” was not just about physically finding or reaching the defendant, it
also depended upon sovereign power—personal jurisdiction—over the
defendant.
In a case involving the Cassius, a vessel owned by the French government,
the district attorney in Philadelphia reasoned that “process of information and
seizure” against the vessel “brings the sovereign to submit to the tribunal”281
and thus there was no jurisdiction over the vessel.282 Similarly, the term
“process” was used in a 1781 case against the state of Virginia (discussed
above) to describe Pennsylvania’s lack of personal jurisdiction over
280. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 123 (1795) (argument of
counsel); United States v. Wilder, 28 F. Cas. 601, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,694) (“[I]t
was considered by the court, that the ground of exemption of the ships of war of a foreign
sovereign, coming into our ports, from all process, was founded upon the implied assent of
our government.”); The Invincible, 13 F. Cas. 72, 74 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7054) (“The
reason that public ships are not subject to a process of this nature is, that the injury is a matter
for discussion between the two governments.”), aff’d sub nom. The L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 238 (1816); Letter from Mr. Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the
French Republic (Aug. 25, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 631, 632 (Washington, Gales
& Seaton 1833) (arguing that the armed French public vessel Le Cassius “should be subjected
to the course of legal process before the courts of the United States”); see also Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 677 (1838) (“If the constitution authorizes the
government of the United States to subject a state to judicial process and judgment, the
government of the United States may pass the laws necessary for the purpose.”); Wadsworth
v. Queen of Spain (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1246 (“Property in England, belonging to a
foreign sovereign prince in his public capacity, cannot be seized under process in a suit”).
281. Case of Le Cassius, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 280, at 637; see also
supra notes 244–47 and accompanying text. The document also quotes the district attorney
as saying:
[I]f the French Government had made a fair and unsuspecting acquisition of the
property of a vessel, then lying in their own ports, and out of the reach of the
jurisdiction of the United States, a cause of forfeiture previously existing . . . could
not, at a future day, revive, so as to subject the same vessel, still remaining property
of a sovereign nation, to the process of our courts.
Case of Le Cassius, supra, at 637.
282. Not surprisingly, the argument against jurisdiction was based upon Nathan v. Virginia
and upon citations to Emer de Vattel and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqi, with Georg Friedrich von
Martens and Cornelius van Bynkershoek cited as “slightly opposed.” Case of Le Cassius,
supra note 281, at 637.
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Virginia.283 With a citation to international law treatises on sovereignty and
jurisdiction, Pennsylvania’s lack of jurisdiction over Virginia was described
in terms of process: “all its process against that state, must be coram non
judice, and consequently void.”284 Process applied to foreign states just as it
did to other states. These sources show that Fifth Amendment “due process”
would have been understood as applying to foreign states.
Recent cases have reasoned that foreign sovereigns are not “persons” and
for that reason are not protected by Fifth Amendment due process. That
conclusion is not based on any historical analysis. In fact, foreign nations
were often described as “persons.” Consider the argument of counsel in The
Santissima Trinidad:
[A] foreign sovereign cannot be compelled to appear in our Courts, or be
made liable to their judgment, so long as he remains in his own dominions,
for the sovereignty of each is bounded by territorial limits. If, however, he
comes personally within our limits, although he generally enjoy a personal
immunity, he may become liable to judicial process in the same way, and
under the same circumstances, as the public ships of the nation.285

Here, “process” is used in part to refer to personal jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign if he comes personally into our territory. Although this quotation
refers to an individual who embodies the state (e.g., the king) as enjoying “a
personal immunity,” it also makes clear that judicial “process” might extend
to public vessels.286 Process against the property of a foreign sovereign was
often considered equivalent to process against the sovereign itself, although
the property itself was not a person.287
One might argue that due process protects foreign sovereigns but only
those that are monarchies or dictatorships, so that the sovereign is actually a
person. That would lead to anomalous modern results, with hostile
dictatorships entitled to constitutional protections. The distinction is also
unwarranted as a historical matter. Personal jurisdiction over both U.S. and
foreign states was discussed in terms of sovereignty, with citations to
international law scholars such as Vattel, whose work was extremely well

283. Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77, 77–79 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1781); Letter from
the Virginia Delegates to the Pennsylvania Council (July 9–10, 1781), in 17 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 389–90 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1990) (discussing the
same dispute); see also supra text accompanying notes 230–37.
284. Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 78.
285. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822); see also id. at 306–07
(argument of counsel).
286. See United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 123 (1795) (argument of counsel)
(“And whereas by the said laws of nations and treaties aforesaid, the vessels of war belonging
to the said French Republic, and the officers commanding the same, cannot, and ought not to
be arrested, seized, attached, or detained, in the ports of the United States, by process of
law . . . .”).
287. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 130 (1812);
Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 77–78; Case of Le Cassius, supra note 281, at 637. See generally
The Parlement Belge [1880] 5 PD 197 (Eng.) (repeatedly referring to lack of jurisdiction as an
exemption from “process” or as a lack of “process to compel him to appear” and describing
in rem jurisdiction as a method of establishing jurisdiction over the person).
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known during the founding era.288 Vattel describes nations as persons,
without regard to their form of government. He notes that “the body of the
nation, the State, remains absolutely free” and refers to nation states as
“moral persons” and as “free persons.”289 Vattel therefore reasons that a
nation is “considered by foreign nations as constituting only one whole, one
single person.”290 The law of nations itself was based in part on ideas drawn
from, and analogies made to, the philosophical understanding of
individuals.291
States as collective entities were even equated with persons in a variety of
ways specifically related to whether they could be reached by process.292
Justice Wilson wrote in Chisholm v. Georgia that “[b]y a State I mean, a
complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to
enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an
artificial person.”293 Chief Justice John Jay in the same case reasoned that
“[s]overeignty is the right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person
or persons in whom that resides.”294 Both justices concluded that states could
be reached through the process of the U.S. courts.295
288. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 133, 169–70 (1998).
289. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, at lv, 2, 164 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W.
Johnson 1854).
290. Id. at 164; see also JAMES KENT, DISSERTATIONS 52 (New York, George Forman 1795)
(referring to states as “moral persons”); James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty, in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 228, at 572 (“Now all Sovereigns are equal; the
Sovereignty of the State is equal to that of the Union; for the Sovereignty of each is but a
moral person. That of the State and that of the Union are each a moral person; and in that
respect precisely equal.”).
291. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 25, at 974–78.
292. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 130 (1812)
(argument of counsel) (“The cases cited on the other side refer only to suits brought directly
against a sovereign, or to compel his appearance. But such cases are wholly inapplicable,
because not brought in consequence of your jurisdiction over the thing within your territory,
but to create a jurisdiction over the person which is without it.”); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S.,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 802–03 (1824) (“But [the state of Ohio] cannot be made a party,
because she cannot be sued. The inevitable consequence is, that the Court below cannot take
jurisdiction of the cause . . . . [H]ere the party omitted is a sovereign State, who is within
reach of process, but is not subject to the jurisdiction, and cannot be brought before the
Court.”).
293. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.); see also
id. at 456 (referring to “the person, natural or artificial”); id. at 460 (“The law continued to be
the same for some centuries after the conquest. Until the time of Edward I. the King might
have been sued as a common person. The form of the process was even imperative.”).
294. Id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.); VATTEL, supra note 289, at lvi (“[T]he body of the
nation, the State, remains absolutely free . . . .); VATTEL, supra note 289, at 2 (referring to all
forms of nation states as “moral persons”); VATTEL, supra note 289, at 164 (“All those who
form a society, a nation being considered by foreign nations as constituting only one whole,
one single person . . . .”).
295. The issue in Chisholm v. Georgia was framed as whether Georgia was amenable to
process. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425–26 (argument of counsel) (“The jurisdiction of this Court
reaches to Georgia, as well as to Philadelphia. If therefore, the process could be commenced
in rem, the authority of Bynkershoek would justify us; and whether it be commenced in rem,
or in personam, the principle of amenability is equally avowed.”); see also JAMES SULLIVAN,
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vi, vii, 30
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Corporations, like states, were often described as “persons.” Just as Vattel
referred to the “body” of the nation, corporations were, for centuries,
described as bodies. Saru Matambanadzo has traced the early history of the
corporation and concludes that “in its earliest incarnations in England and the
United States,” the “recognition of corporations as persons” was justified
because “the corporation was imagined to resemble a body.”296 Just as
Justice Wilson referred to states as “artificial” persons, corporations were
understood first as “artificial bodies” and then, beginning in the eighteenth
century, as artificial persons.297 The connection between states and
corporations as “bodies” was sometimes made explicit; the corporation as a
body was described as a “body politic” like a state.298
The historical association of the term “person” with artificial entities such
as corporations, U.S. states, and nation states is clear, as the foregoing
discussion has shown. Foreign states were not only referred to as “persons”
but were also identified with the term “process,” as were other artificial
entities. On textual and historical grounds, application of Fifth Amendment
due process protections to foreign states is straightforward.
That foreign states are protected by due process does not tell us what the
content of those protections are, however. As described in Part III.A, when
it comes to personal jurisdiction, due process limitations may be largely
coextensive with the process that Congress chooses to provide. Readers
might assume that if foreign states are entitled to due process, the actions of
Congress will be constrained. Instead, under the argument advanced in Part
III.A, Congress is not limited by “minimum contacts” in determining the
jurisdiction of the federal courts over any kind of defendant, whether private
or public.
3. Due Process and Separation of Powers
Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have argued that due process is
best understood in separation of powers terms and that it constrains Congress
just as it limits executive and judicial power.299 Other scholars argue that
due process is not applicable to legislative acts.300 The foreign-state analysis
supports due process limitations on legislative power in two ways. First, it
connects, for the first time, the litigation-related protections afforded by
(Boston, Samuel Hall 1791) (asking whether “the separate states, as states, are liable to be
called to answer before any tribunal by civil process” and arguing that “states, as states, were
not liable to the civil process of the supreme judicial of the Union”).
296. Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV. 457, 487–88
(2013).
297. Id. at 490–91. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1992) (describing very broad conceptions of legal
“persons”).
298. See Matambanadzo, supra note 296, at 488; see also infra notes 343–46 and
accompanying text. See generally Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate
Statehood, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2019) (emphasizing the close historical relationship
between corporations and governmental entities such as states).
299. See generally Chapman & McConnell, supra note 26.
300. See id. at 1676 n.5 (collecting sources).
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Article III to those in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Personal jurisdiction and notice were required by the vesting of “judicial”
and only “judicial power” with the federal courts. That relationship between
Article III and due process supports the argument that due process also
prevented actors other than courts (i.e., the legislature) from exercising
judicial power. Due process was very much about limiting judicial power,
including both the scope of that power (as argued here) and who can exercise
it (as Chapman and McConnell have argued). Second, one criticism of their
position is the redundancy it tolerates between due process and specific
prohibitions on legislative action, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause.301
The foreign-state analysis in this Article shows that due process was
redundant of the procedural protections baked into Article III as well.
Overlap and duplication between due process and separation of powers is
everywhere.
The redundancy between separation of powers and due process also means
that just as due process protects foreign states, so too, does separation of
powers. There is no textual basis for concluding that foreign states are
protected by the separation of powers limitations in the Fifth Amendment
and by the Article III vesting of “judicial power” in the federal courts but not
by other separation of powers protections. Indeed, courts have often assumed
that foreign states may raise separation of powers arguments.302 Additional
evidence supports this argument. Separation of powers principles were
understood to protect entities other than individual “persons.” For example,
in 1772 the East India Company argued that Parliament could not restrict its
charter rights through laws that were “arbitrary” or “partial” and that the
proper remedy for the corporate malfeasance in question was a “common law
action.”303 Colonists raised similar separation of powers arguments against
the Massachusetts Acts, which changed the terms of the Massachusetts
Charter as punishment for the Boston Tea Party.304 The First Continental
Congress charged that the Acts violated the “law of the land” (a phrase
sometimes used interchangeably with due process) because they changed the
“form of government” without “being heard, without being tried, without
law, and without justice.”305 Although neither example extended separation
of powers protections to foreign states, both illustrate that the separation of
powers protections were not limited to individual “persons.”
III. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES REVISITED
This Article has examined Article III and due process from the perspective
of the protections they afford to foreign states. Doing so brings together
301. Id. at 1721.
302. See supra Part I.B.
303. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 26, at 1697–98.
304. Id. at 1701.
305. Id. at 1701–02 (quoting from Address to the People of Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774),
in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 81, 86, 87 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904).
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strands of doctrine and scholarship that seem almost entirely unconnected
today. If foreign states are not protected by the Fifth Amendment, as lower
courts have held, it becomes important to determine the full extent of their
protections under Article III, which mentions them specifically. Viewing
Article III in this way blurs doctrinal distinctions between subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction and pulls together historical scholarship
on the immunity of U.S. states and the procedural protections due to foreign
states. Procedural protections that are today associated with due process
were protected by Article III and separation of powers.
Turning to the Fifth Amendment, contemporary historical work on
personal jurisdiction generally bears little connection to the historical work
on “due process.”306 That disconnect arises in part because modern personal
jurisdiction (even in federal court) is mostly a function of the limitations
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on state court jurisdiction and not
those imposed by the Fifth Amendment on federal court jurisdiction.307
Scholars today struggle to see the relationship between due process and
personal jurisdiction at all, an effort that has focused on the meaning of
Pennoyer.308 But as we have seen, early cases against foreign states highlight
the connection, one that is based on the text of the Fifth Amendment itself:
courts asked whether “process” could reach a foreign state as a way of asking
whether the foreign state was outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign.
Deprivations of property required “process” to be valid, and process reached
only as far as jurisdiction.309 That relationship does not emerge clearly in
early case law because the jurisdiction of federal courts was limited,310
because Article III also required personal jurisdiction, and because the
content of the personal jurisdiction rules came from general law, not from the
Constitution, as the next section describes.
A. Personal Jurisdiction and Other Due Process Protections
An important question remains: the content of the due process and Article
III protections to which states and other defendants are entitled. The extent
to which the outcomes of contemporary cases will change under the analysis
developed here depends upon how one answers this question. If due process
means that “minimum contacts” analysis applies to cases against foreign
states, then those cases will come out differently than under the current
approach in which they are not entitled to minimum contacts protections. But
306. Originalist scholarship on due process generally focuses on substantive due process.
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 20, at 412.
307. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 27.
309. Cf. Nelson, supra note 23, at 1568 (noting the use of the word process in his work
linking domestic state immunity and personal jurisdiction). Robin Effron has described the
confused relationship between service, notice, and personal jurisdiction prior to Pennoyer v.
Neff without discussing the Fifth Amendment. See generally Effron, supra note 27.
310. Sachs, supra note 27, at 1303 (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal original
jurisdiction to areas that were perfectly safe on general-law principles; anything unusual
would lose on statutory grounds first.”).
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if due process does not entitle defendants to “minimum contacts,” then the
outcomes for foreign states may not change much and the outcomes for other
defendants, including SOEs and private corporations, would change very
significantly. The discussion here focuses on personal jurisdiction (as a
function of both Article III and Fifth Amendment due process) but turns at
the end to other due process limitations.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause limits state court assertions of personal jurisdiction based on
minimum contacts and reasonableness.311 The Court has not, however, held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes comparable
limitations. Lower courts and some commentators have generally concluded
that the Fifth Amendment limitations are comparable, except that the relevant
sovereign and territory is the United States as a whole, instead of the forum
state.312 There is, however, widespread agreement that the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis is an incoherent
mess.313 The Court should pause before importing that mess into the Fifth
Amendment.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments arguably impose comparable
limitations on personal jurisdiction because they use the same language,
except for the relevant sovereign.314 It is possible, however, that the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments should be interpreted in different ways
because the term “due process” was understood differently in 1868 than it
was in 1791.315 It is also possible that “minimum contacts” is not a
convincing interpretation of the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and for that reason it should not dictate the interpretation of the

311. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
312. See, e.g., Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 330 (2d Cir. 2016)
(finding that precedents “clearly establish the congruence of due process analysis under both
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments”); see also Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (similar); Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (similar);
supra note 47 and accompanying text. Constitutional scholars who draw a distinction between
the Due Processes Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not generally discuss
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 20.
313. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, What Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Does—And What It
Should Do, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2016) (“Commentators have routinely noted
the complexity, opacity, and multiple functions of U.S. personal jurisdiction doctrine.”);
Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?: Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) (“Something about
personal jurisdiction seems to bring out the worst in the Supreme Court.”); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Nationwide Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. L. REV. 325, 328 (2010)
(stating that the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction doctrine “is notoriously
confusing and imprecise”).
314. See Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 523
(2019); Spencer, supra note 47 (manuscript at 16–17).
315. See Williams, supra note 20, at 408 (arguing that “[b]etween 1791 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment in 1868, due process concepts evolved dramatically”).
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Fifth Amendment.316 For those who eschew originalism, it bears repeating
that “minimum contacts” is extremely widely criticized on policy grounds.
Cases involving foreign states provide no support for extending the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “minimum contacts” analysis to the Fifth
Amendment. Instead, they support the claim made by others that historical
due process limitations bear little resemblance to modern personal
jurisdiction doctrine.317 Jurisdictional rules traditionally came from “general
law” which included customary international law—not from the
Constitution.318 The general law could be changed through a treaty or a
statute. The Supreme Court reasoned during the early nineteenth century that
although federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction over foreign states
(because they were immune from suit under existing law), Congress could
extend personal jurisdiction and abrogate the immunity of foreign states if it
wanted to do so.319
The cases involving foreign states suggest that the Constitution itself does
not dictate the rules governing personal jurisdiction, whether as a function of
Article III or of the Fifth Amendment. Other authors, including Wendy
Perdue and Stephen Sachs have argued that Pennoyer v. Neff is best
understood as requiring personal jurisdiction without setting the rules for
how far such jurisdiction extends.320 As an analogy, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires recognition of a judgment only if the rendering court had
subject matter jurisdiction under the rules of the rendering court, and the Due
Process Clauses are sometimes interpreted as requiring only that judges
follow duly enacted law.321 Even if Article III and the Fifth Amendment do
not set out any rules of (or limits on) personal jurisdiction, they do require
that whatever those rules are, they must be satisfied. These could be termed
“positivist”322 limitations on judicial power.
By modern ears, such protections are minimal, but they are also not
nothing. They prevented arbitrary actions of federal courts, and they
comported with the general eighteenth-century views of parliamentary
supremacy.323 Congress may, of course, afford foreign states greater
316. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning?: On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV.
1, 24 (2007).
317. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 46, at 9; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again,
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 40 (1990); Conison, supra note 27, at 1104.
318. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 181 (2004).
319. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Treaties
could also displace the jurisdictional rules supplied by general law. See The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 354–55 (1822).
320. See Perdue, supra note 313, at 732; Sachs, supra note 27, at 1318.
321. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); see also John
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 497
(1997).
322. Williams, supra note 20, at 420 (describing this view of due process).
323. See Julian Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1191–201 (2019).
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jurisdictional protections than the Constitution requires. That decision lies
with Congress, not the courts, so that international friction results not from
shaky constitutional lines drawn by the courts but instead from the actions of
Congress. Reading the Article III and Fifth Amendment requirements for
personal jurisdiction as “merely” positivist also leaves open the question of
how statutory limitations should be interpreted. International law may
inform statutory interpretation in many ways. At a minimum, under the
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy324 canon of interpretation, statutes
should be interpreted when possible to avoid conflicts with international
law.325
One might argue in favor of robust constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction, especially as a function of Article III, based on the statements of
John Marshall and James Madison that suits against U.S. states or foreign
states could only go forward with the “consent” of the sovereign, which
might suggest that their personal jurisdiction defenses were constitutionally
entrenched.326 In other words, on the reading offered here, states and foreign
sovereigns do not have to “consent” to suit if Congress chooses to subject
them to jurisdiction, arguably in tension with the statements by Madison and
Marshall when discussing Article III. But at the time Madison and Marshall
wrote, Congress was extremely unlikely to subject foreign states to broad
personal jurisdiction. As well, the term “consent” was used even when the
defendant was unwillingly subjected to the jurisdiction of a court. To
“consent” meant to come within the court’s jurisdiction—whether or not one
formally agreed to, or otherwise welcomed, the suit itself.327
Finally, it is possible that by requiring due process of law, the Fifth
Amendment meant that the process issued to compel defendants to appear
must conform to (or provide comparable protections to) traditional forms of
process.328 Abolishing any and all personal jurisdiction (or notice)
limitations in federal courts might violate “due process” by eliminating
“process” altogether and it might also violate Article III by authorizing a
power not linked to sovereignty or territory at all, and therefore one that is
not “judicial.”329 These limitations would not, however, support personal
jurisdiction doctrine based upon minimum contacts and reasonableness. It is
324. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
325. See David L. Sloss et al., International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court to 1860, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 7, 37 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
326. See Nelson, supra note 23, at 1610.
327. See Levy, supra note 210, at 25–26 (discussing the idea that “recourse to a law court
depends upon the consent of the parties” and noting that such consent was frequently obtained
through duress); see also Neuman, supra note 8, at 926 (citing many early modern theorists
who “presumed the tacit consent of those defeated in a just war to the government of the
conqueror”).
328. See Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process of War, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639, 655
(2018); Chapman & McConnell, supra note 26, at 1721–25 (emphasis added); cf. Conison,
supra note 27, at 1100.
329. See Williams, supra note 20, at 454 (arguing in favor of a largely positivist approach
to the Fifth Amendment but noting that due process “limit[s] the legislature’s discretion in
prescribing certain modes of judicial procedure”).
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also possible that the Fifth Amendment and Article III provide different
levels or kinds of personal jurisdiction protections. As already noted, courts
had little opportunity for direct consideration of constitutional limitations on
personal jurisdiction because of other limitations on jurisdiction. Whether or
not the two differ in their personal jurisdiction protections, foreign states are
protected by both Article III and the Fifth Amendment, both of which
required (at a minimum) the satisfaction of the applicable nonconstitutional
rules governing personal jurisdiction.
If the Fifth Amendment and Article III afford only “positivist” personal
jurisdiction protections, the outcomes of lower court cases holding that due
process does not protect foreign states need not be reversed, although they
were incorrectly reasoned. That is, if due process protects foreign states but
due process only entitles them to what Congress gives them, then cases
extending broad personal jurisdiction under the FSIA reach the correct
outcome, even if they incorrectly reason that foreign states are not persons
and have no due process rights.330 The cases that would come out differently
going forward under a positivist approach to personal jurisdiction are those
that were dismissed based upon a Fifth Amendment minimum contacts
analysis—in other words, cases against SOEs not classified as foreign states
and those against private defendants.331 One might preserve the outcomes of
these cases by reasoning that Congress has acted or failed to act under the
assumption that private entities and SOEs are protected by minimum
contacts.332 Doing so would prevent an abrupt change of doctrine and would
allow Congress to set future rules for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
federal courts over all defendants. In any event, whatever personal
jurisdiction protections are provided by due process and Article III, they
apply to foreign states just as they do to private defendants. The Bancec test
is accordingly irrelevant for due process purposes, contrary to the many
lower court cases holding otherwise.
Finally, due process provides protections beyond personal jurisdiction.
Article III requires notice as an aspect of judicial power, as discussed in Part
II.A.3, and the Fifth Amendment also requires notice. The Article III and the
Fifth Amendment notice requirements may differ, but whatever those
330. See, e.g., Corporacíon Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v.
Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016); Price v. Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept.
11, 2001, 298 F. Supp. 3d 631, 659 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Simpson v. Socialist People’s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 470 F.3d 356 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 362 F. Supp. 2d 103, 115 (D.D.C. 2005).
331. See, e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Waldman v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 344 (2d Cir. 2016); First Inv. Corp. of Marsh. Is. v.
Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 744–45 (5th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Romarm
S.A., 116 F. Supp. 3d 631, 637 (D. Md. 2015).
332. Cf. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petróleos de Venez., S.A., 251 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769 (D.
Del. 2017) (using the minimum contacts analysis to interpret the FSIA); see also
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED
TOPICS IN TREATIES, JURISDICTION, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY § 454 reporters’ note 9 (AM.
LAW INST. 2018).
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requirements are, foreign states are entitled to them. Courts and scholars
have worried that affording due process rights to foreign states could
hamstring U.S. responses to foreign policy crises because “the power of
Congress and the President to freeze the assets of foreign nations, or to
impose economic sanctions on them, could be challenged as deprivations of
property without due process of law.”333 Fifth Amendment due process
rights are limited and flexible, however. Some rights protect “natural, not
artificial persons,” and they are likely inapplicable to foreign states just as
they are to corporations.334 Due process rights often do not apply
extraterritorially, a limitation with obvious importance for the rights of
foreign states.335 Due process is also flexible. In the context of notice, for
example, it requires what is “reasonable” “under all the circumstances.”336
Beyond notice, due process generally gives courts adequate room to calibrate
the protections to which foreign states might be entitled in particular cases.337
After all, the leading formulation of procedural due process protections
explicitly requires courts to consider the U.S. government’s interests in the
challenged policy338—interests with great weight if, for example, the nation
were facing a foreign policy or national security crisis.
B. Other Constitutional Rights
Viewing the Constitution from the perspective of foreign states shows that
that they have due process rights and that they are protected by separation of
powers. It also provides the groundwork for analyzing whether foreign states
have additional constitutional rights. That analysis should reject general
theories of constitutional exclusion and inclusion, should take a right-byright approach, and should generally provide to foreign states the same
litigation-related rights that other defendants enjoy.
Scholars writing on the rights of aliens and the extraterritorial application
of the Constitution ask questions with titles such as “Whose
Constitution?”339 and Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?340 If those are
the questions, it is easy to see why courts and commentators have been quick
to exclude foreign states. No entity is less like a “citizen”—even an alien can
333. Price, 294 F.3d at 99; see also Damrosch, supra note 4, at 485–86, 527–30.
334. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
335. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Compare Nathan S.
Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2017) (arguing that “the
founding generation understood due process to apply to any exercise of federal law
enforcement, criminal or civil, against any person anywhere in the world”), with Andrew Kent,
Piracy and Due Process, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 391 (2018).
336. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
337. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))).
338. See id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (plurality opinion).
339. Neuman, supra note 8, at 910.
340. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009).
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give temporary fealty to the United States in a way that a foreign state
cannot.341 No entity is so thoroughly “outside” the territory of the United
States and outside “we the people” than a foreign sovereign state itself, which
is defined in terms of its own territory and its own people. But the
Constitution was not drafted as an answer to these abstract questions. It was
drafted instead to address particular problems. Article III, for example, was
written in part to address problems of state court bias that generated conflict
with other countries. Yet by focusing narrowly on the word “person” in the
Fifth Amendment and building a theory of exclusion around it, courts have
turned federal judicial power (to which the Fifth Amendment applies)
entirely on its head. When it comes to issues of inclusion and exclusion, the
Constitution did not demarcate—or even assume as fixed background
principles—sharp categories of general applicability.342
Consider another constitutional category: corporations. As described
above, current doctrine draws a constitutional distinction between foreign
corporations and foreign governments. Yet foreign corporations were
difficult to separate from foreign nations themselves even in the late
eighteenth century, as the East India Company example illustrates. Most
corporations at the time were created to serve public purposes such as
building infrastructure.343
Even with respect to purely domestic
corporations, efforts to draw sharp constitutional lines broke down
quickly.344 Today, the Court’s approach to the constitutional rights of private
corporations starts not with a theory of business entities or of the nature of
corporations but instead with a right-by-right analysis, focusing upon the
significance and nature of the injury to the corporation.345 A right-by-right
approach makes sense for foreign states as well. Without overstating the
comparison, some of the Court’s reasoning with respect to corporations—for
example, that they lack certain rights deemed “personal”—provides strong
reasons to deny those same rights to foreign states.346
Foreign states share constitutionally significant attributes not just with
corporations but also with U.S. states. As originally understood, “process”
protected foreign and U.S. states.347 Both were also afforded special status
in Article III. There are, however, important constitutional distinctions. U.S.
341. Cf. AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON
GUANTANAMO BAY 55 (2017) (noting that under English law the right of habeas
traditionally extended to aliens who had temporary allegiance to the government).
342. Contra Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains:
Changing Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2015) (“The longstanding form or structure of rights protection was based
on categorical rules and boundary-drawing.”).
343. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 48 (2018) (“In Blackstone’s day . . .
corporations more clearly straddled the divide between public and private.”).
344. See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809).
345. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 139–40 (2014).
346. Id. at 149 (noting that corporations do not have personal rights such as certain privacy
rights, the right to marry, serve on juries, or vote).
347. See supra Part II.B.2.
TO
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states ceded authority to the federal government by ratifying the Constitution,
and they are also explicitly protected by it in ways that foreign states are
not.348 Although that reasoning does not support the broad conclusion that
foreign states are entitled to no constitutional rights, it may support other
distinctions. For example, lower courts have held that U.S. states, but not
foreign states, are entitled to sue parens patriae on behalf of their residents.
Those cases are correct in reasoning that U.S. states are limited in their ability
to engage in diplomatic negotiations with other U.S. states in order to protect
their citizens, reasoning that does not fully apply to foreign states.349
The constitutional rights of foreign nations are also limited by the
constitutional powers of other actors. Consider the right of access to court, a
constitutional right with an “unsettled” basis that appears to include the First
and Fifth Amendments.350 Foreign states are entitled to bring suit in state
and federal courts, an entitlement usually described as an aspect of
international comity rather than a constitutional right,351 and one that is
limited to recognized foreign governments.352 In practice, the exception for
“unrecognized” governments is a narrow one somewhat at odds with the
comity rationale, because “recognized” governments with whom the United
States has no diplomatic relations are entitled to access courts as plaintiffs.353
Assuming that access to court is a constitutional right enjoyed by foreign
nations, the distinction between recognized and unrecognized states might be
preserved as an aspect of the president’s exclusive power to recognize foreign
governments. That power, recently underscored by the Supreme Court,354
could at least arguably include the right to decide which state-like entities are
entitled to access the courts in the United States and which are not.355
Generally applicable limitations on constitutional rights and constitutional
redress also curtail the protections to which foreign states are entitled.
Territorial limits are an important example, as mentioned above.356
Relatedly, the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments extend certain
protections to “the people.” That phrase, the Court has reasoned, “refers to
a class of persons who are part of a national community,” a classification

348. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
349. See, e.g., Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 337 (1st Cir. 2000).
350. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).
351. Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1978); see also William S. Dodge,
International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2116 (2015).
352. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 319–20.
353. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the
Case Against “Judicial Imperialism,” 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 660–61 (2016).
354. See generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
355. But see Wuerth, supra note 104, at 1837–38 (distinguishing between recognition itself
and legal consequences that follow from recognition).
356. Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 943 (2011) (“[I]f the First Amendment speaks
at all beyond U.S. borders, it does so with only the faintest voice.”); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Transborder Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 473, 473 (2018) (“First
Amendment law and theory must recognize that the freedom of speech does not end at the
water’s edge.”).
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which may exclude foreign states as it does some aliens.357 The government
may limit First Amendment and other constitutional rights when it has a
compelling reason to do so,358 a standard that may be relatively easy to meet
when the government regulates foreign nations to protect national
security.359 For example, the Takings Clause was drafted in part to protect
those who are vulnerable because they are geographically and, thus
politically, excluded from normal legislative decision-making,360 suggesting
that foreign states ought to be presumptively included in, not excluded from,
protection.361 Nevertheless, claims seeking compensation for war or
national-security related takings by the government face significant hurdles
when brought by any kind of entity.362 Justiciability doctrines such as
standing and the political question doctrine also limit litigation brought by
foreign states.363
But when foreign states and related entities face suit in the United States
(whether a criminal action brought by federal prosecutors or a civil case
based on an exception to the FSIA) basic litigation-related constitutional
protections should generally apply.364 That conclusion is supported by the
words “person” and “accused” in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating
procedure in civil and criminal cases.365 The term “person” has
straightforward application to foreign states, as we have seen, and the word
“accused” appears to refer to a person against whom the government brings
a criminal action. Foreign states should thus be constitutionally entitled not
only to due process protections but also to assistance of counsel, the right to
a jury trial, and protection against double jeopardy.366 The wholesale
357. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
358. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
359. Cf. United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (deferring to
the government’s interest and rejecting a corporations’ regulatory takings claim during
wartime).
360. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 827–36 (1995).
361. Cf. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (reasoning in
a Takings Clause case brought by a foreign corporation that the “petitioner was an alien friend,
and as such was entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution”). For a discussion of whether the Takings Clause applies to a claim held by a
U.S. national against a foreign state, see generally Alan E. Brownstein, The Takings Clause
and the Iranian Claims Settlement, 29 UCLA L. REV. 984 (1982).
362. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21040, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: FIFTH AMENDMENT “TAKINGS” ISSUES 1–6 (2001).
363. Buxbaum, supra note 353, at 661–65.
364. See Garrett, supra note 345, at 134 (“[W]hen a corporation can sue and be sued . . .
we can see why the court would then assume that any litigant should receive the same trial
protections.”).
365. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990). The rights against
self-incrimination and some Fourth Amendment rights are currently limited to real persons
and might not apply. See Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human
Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 81, 83 (2010); see also Garrett, supra note 345, at 122–28 (arguing
that corporations have broader Fourth Amendment rights than Slobogin acknowledges).
366. Cf. Garrett, supra note 345, at 97, 158 (arguing that corporations should have the right
to assistance of counsel); Matambanadzo, supra note 296, at 471–72 (explaining that
corporations are entitled to some of these rights).
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exclusion of foreign states from constitutional protections when they face suit
in the United States cuts against the grain of Article III, which explicitly
brought foreign entities into the federal judicial system with the intention of
protecting them. Of more immediate practical significance, those protections
apply to state-owned enterprises as they do to private corporations without
the need to distinguish SOEs from foreign states.
CONCLUSION
Foreign states were an important audience for the Constitution. The
framers sought to minimize conflict with other nations so as to ensure peace,
to promote commerce, and to allow the United States to fully join the
international community. Certain forms of constitutional inclusion, not
categorical exclusion, were ultimately selected as the best way to achieve
these aims. Foreign states accordingly benefitted from the extension of
federal judicial power to include foreign-state diversity jurisdiction. The
vesting of “judicial power” over “cases” also limited what federal courts
could do as a matter of process and procedure. Federal courts only have
power over defendants to whom notice is provided and over whom the court
has jurisdiction, and these limitations apply to all defendants. Foreign states
are also entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Contemporary
doctrine has lost sight of these basic principles and drawn false constitutional
distinctions between foreign states, foreign corporations, and foreign stateowned corporations, putting foreign states at a constitutional disadvantage as
compared to private actors, an outcome at odds with the purposes that
animated Article III.
Viewing litigation-related constitutional rights from the perspective of
foreign states draws together parts of the Constitution in ways that scholars
have not yet done. Article III is a source of procedural protections such as
personal jurisdiction and notice that today we associate exclusively with Fifth
Amendment due process. Cases involving foreign sovereigns illustrate that
Fifth Amendment “process” meant a territorially restricted power to compel
attendance before the court, linking the term to personal jurisdiction. That
power was also limited by the power of the sovereign itself. If a court lacked
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, even one located within the territory
of the forum court, process could not issue. Absent personal jurisdiction,
there was also no Article III “case” and no “judicial power.” Due process
protections were indeed duplicative of protections already provided to all
defendants through separation of powers. These observations resolve
modern doctrinal problems in a sensible way, and they also knit together
ideas other scholars have advanced to understand domestic state sovereign
immunity, personal jurisdiction, and the original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.

